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# The English Republic and the Meaning of Britain\*

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English historians have over the past decade or so engaged in a salutary exercise in self-criticism. With the erosion of old certainties about the manifest destiny of English constitutional history, scholars—like Westminster politicians—have been reminded that other inhabitants of the British isles, be they Scots, Irish, or Welsh, have claims to be considered. Nowhere has the impact of the challenge to Anglocentrism been clearer than in explanations of the great upheaval of the mid-seventeenth century. Assumptions that analyses could be safely confined geographically, if not thematically or chronologically, are now generally in question as “the war of the three kingdoms” begins to replace “the English civil war” in academic parlance.<sup>1</sup> Yet the insensitivity of English historians to developments on what used to be deemed the periphery was truer to an important part of the historical record than is the new multiculturalism.

English chauvinism is, after all, not an invention of the twentieth century. English historians seeking English causes of an English civil war found ample warrant in the English sources they naturally enough studied. We have long been made familiar with the localism of seventeenth-century England, whose inhabitants often found it easier to think in terms of county than of kingdom. Nation, in its turn, with its familiar administrative and political boundaries,

\* An earlier version of this article was delivered to a conference titled “Multiple Kingdoms” at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in April 1990. I am grateful to those present, and especially to John Morrill, for their comments.

<sup>1</sup> Appropriately enough, the leading advocates of such a shift in terms have not been found at English universities. The first major proponent of the “three kingdom” thesis was the Irish historian J. C. Beckett, in chap. 4 of his *Making of Modern Ireland, 1603–1923* (New York, 1966); his call was taken up and amplified by J. G. A. Pocock, an Antipodean transplanted to North America, in “British History: A Plea for a New Subject,” *Journal of Modern History* 47 (1975): 601–24, and in “The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject,” *American Historical Review* 87 (1982): 311–36; and it was given perhaps its most systematic application by the Scottish historian D. Stevenson, particularly in *Alasdair MacColla and the Highland Problem in the Seventeenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1980), and *Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates* (Belfast, 1981). See also the remarks of Arthur H. Williamson, “From the Invention of Great Britain to the Creation of British History: A New Historiography,” *Journal of British Studies* 29 (1990): 267–76.

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was a far more congenial concept than was that modern category “multiple kingdoms,” whose constitutional, let alone political, implications were scarcely explored. Modern historians who ignore the world beyond Tweed and the Irish Sea can find consolation in the observation of the first and greatest of their number, the Earl of Clarendon: “The truth is there was little curiosity either in the court or the country to know anything of Scotland or what was done there, that when the whole nation was solicitous to know what passed weekly in Germany and Poland and all other parts of Europe, no man ever inquired what was doing in Scotland, nor had that kingdom a place or mention in one page of any gazette, so little the world heard or thought of that people.”<sup>2</sup> Even when the advent of a logistically sophisticated army brought improved communications in its wake, political as well as physical geography still limited horizons. Seizing the chance offered by a passing army messenger, one senior officer in the southwest wrote breathlessly in 1650 to a friend in southern Ireland, “at as great a distance as sea and land can make.”<sup>3</sup> If uncertainty encompassed even the army command, the incomprehension elsewhere must have been all the greater—especially since few maps of the neighboring territories were available.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, our Olympian vantage, offering all the consolations of hindsight and a perspective that is at least potentially pan-British, risks obscuring the sense of their world held by Clarendon’s contemporaries. We may think we know what the term “Britain” means; but we should pause a little—as successive rulers were forced to do—before requiring our forebears to think supranationally. Historians of early modern Ireland have expended considerable energy in pursuit of an Irish identity within a British state.<sup>5</sup> However different its role, England was no less a part of a larger British whole; what meaning that status had in the seventeenth century has yet to be studied. One

<sup>2</sup> Edward, Earl of Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, ed. W. D. Macray, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1888), 1:145.

<sup>3</sup> MS. X.d.483, 50, Folger Library, Washington, D.C.

<sup>4</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1650*, PRO, p. 328. Speed and Camden doubtless proved either unobtainable or too expensive: see R. Bird, ed., *The Journal of Giles Moore* (Sussex, 1971), pp. 180, 181, 218, for some comparative costs. Some first-rate cartography was at last in progress by the late 1650s, albeit in the Netherlands: R. Hermannides, *Rutgeri Hermannidae Britannia Magna* (Amsterdam, 1661); I am grateful to Kathleen Colquhoun for this reference.

<sup>5</sup> See esp. A. Clarke, “Colonial Identity in Early Seventeenth-century Ireland,” *Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence*, ed. T. W. Moody (Belfast, 1978), pp. 57–71; N. P. Canny, “Identity Formation in Ireland: The Emergence of the Anglo-Irish,” in *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800*, ed. N. P. Canny and A. Pagden (Princeton, N.J., 1987), pp. 159–212; and T. C. Barnard, “Crisis of Identity among Irish Protestants, 1641–1685,” *Past and Present*, no. 126 (1990), pp. 39–83.

answer is suggested by the ability of Shakespeare's John of Gaunt to see "this England," standing alone, as "this sceptred isle."<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Clarendon's castigation of the myopia of those around him points to the prevalence in the prewar years of a similarly complacent Anglocentrism. But in the Republic, conquest and forcible union brought the relations among what had been the more or less discrete political units of Britain unavoidably into the view of politicians, of newsbook readers, and of those in the way of the marching armies. The process and the consequences of unification, and English responses to it, offer an unparalleled opportunity to study the sense of place held by those who inhabited the core state of "the Atlantic archipelago."<sup>7</sup> In the middle of the seventeenth century England came close to experiencing a genuinely British moment; that moment shows that if Britishness appealed little to those south—if not, significantly, north—of the border with Scotland, they were by no means immune to its effects. If the Scots and the Irish suffered from union, so too in other ways did the English. Indeed, the British problem was to prove as damned an inheritance for the Republic as it had been for Charles I, whom it had done so much to destroy.

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The Commonwealth's eventual solution to that problem was a formal union of the three states of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Yet the shaping of the policy of union, far from pointing to some coherent and supranational vision in the fledgling Republic, in fact adds one more chapter to the familiar story of contingency and crisis. If empire was eventually acquired in a fit of absence of mind, so too was a united Britain.<sup>8</sup>

The pressure of circumstance is particularly clear in the shifting of policy toward Ireland. The domestic peace that came to England with the close of the so-called second civil war of 1648—whose "civil" dimensions were belied by Scottish invasion—was bound to signal major changes in relations with Ireland. The massacre of protestant settlers in Ireland in 1641 and the near loss of the whole island to the forces of the Catholic Confederacy in the ensuing war ensured that England would, once it was freed from its internal

<sup>6</sup> *Richard II*, act 2, sc. 1, lines 40–50.

<sup>7</sup> The phrase is Pocock's, in "British History," *passim*.

<sup>8</sup> The Commonwealth was scarcely alone in its shortsightedness and its chauvinism. The dealings of the restored Rump and the council of safety with the Scots in 1659 were as one-sided, as cynical, as were the negotiations of 1652–53; and the record of the restored crown in the unhappy years after 1660 was to be no better. See esp. D. H. Fleming and J. D. Ogilvie, eds., *The Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston*, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1911–40), 3:127 (hereafter, cited as *Diary of Johnston of Wariston*); General Monck, at least, seems to have had hopes of something more substantial (R. Spalding, *Contemporaries of Bulstrode Whitelocke, 1605–1675*, British Academy Records of Social and Economic History, n.s. 14 [Oxford, 1990], p. 3).

distractions, pay closer attention to its western neighbor. Yet however turbulent and dangerous Ireland's recent history, there was little in Anglo-Irish relations in the 1640s—still less in republican ideology—to push England into its eventual course of formal union with what had so long been a dependency. The very antiquity of England's engagement in Ireland, and the cultural and religious differences involved, ensured that thinking rarely passed beyond a visceral determination to extirpate any remnants of rebellion.<sup>9</sup> The verdict of one newsbook early in 1652, that “the only way to save that Land, is to destroy it,” reminds us how easy Englishmen found it to avoid constitutional reflection when they thought of Ireland.<sup>10</sup> A correspondent of the journalist Marchamont Nedham reflected what was probably the English consensus when he hoped, as Irish resistance crumbled that year, that “a short time will bring them all upon their knees, and make way for the doing Justice upon the bloody part of them that Englishmen may once more live in peace in Ireland.”<sup>11</sup> There is something typical too in Cromwell's utter certainty, expressed in his angry letter to the Catholic hierarchy at Clonmacnoise during the 1649 campaign, that the English presence in Ireland was in large part a matter of property rights, triable at law: “Remember, ye hypocrites, Ireland was once united to England. Englishmen had good inheritances, which many of them purchased with their money; they or their ancestors, from many of you and your ancestors.”<sup>12</sup> Such confidence is apparent as well in the repeated insistence—an insistence that willfully ignored those so recently expropriated and suppressed—in Richard Cromwell's Parliament that the Irish “are all English” and “born free.”<sup>13</sup> The conviction—born of nearly five hundred years of involvement as well as of recent conquest—of the straightforwardly “English” status of Ireland was widespread; though more complicated with

<sup>9</sup> Although the protests from the Leveller William Walwyn at the prevailing eagerness to subordinate Ireland are famous, he was by no means representative even of the radicals; see Christopher Hill, “Seventeenth-Century English Radicals and Ireland,” in his *A Nation of Change and Novelty: Radical Politics, Religion and Literature in Seventeenth-Century England* (London, 1990), pp. 133–51, esp. pp. 142–47.

<sup>10</sup> *Weekly Intelligencer* (January 13–20, 1651–52), p. 327.

<sup>11</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (April 15–22, 1652), p. 1542.

<sup>12</sup> W. C. Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1937–47), 2:197 (hereafter, cited as *Writings and Speeches*).

<sup>13</sup> J. T. Rutt, ed., *The Parliamentary Diary of Thomas Burton*, 4 vols. (London, 1828), 4:114, 145, 230, 239 (hereafter, cited as *Diary of Thomas Burton*). That confidence undoubtedly increased in the course of the 1650s with the dramatic extension of “new English” landownership and the reduction in the status of the “old English,” the descendants of pre-Elizabethan settlers—for whom see A. Clarke, *The Old English in Ireland* (Worcester, 1966)—whose Catholicism had so complicated any analysis of protestant England's relations to Ireland.

bitter resentments, it was probably no more conducive to constitutional reform than a later conviction of the English status of colonists across the Atlantic Ocean was to prove. Only at the very end of the republic were English voices heard speculating on the proper constitutional relationship of Ireland to England. And when a few English MPs serving for Irish constituencies in the Protectorate's last Parliament argued vainly for a separate Irish assembly on the grounds of Ireland's distance from Westminster, they testified merely to problems that had arisen in the working out of union and the provisions of the Cromwellian Instrument of Government, and not to any recognition of a longer-standing dilemma.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, when Englishmen formulated what might be called a British policy, they did so toward Scotland and then applied it as an afterthought to Ireland.<sup>15</sup>

It is in the complicated dealings with Scotland that English assumptions and expectations about Britain must be sought. An independent unitary state in a way that Ireland had never been, Scotland had been linked to England primarily through the dynastic tie of the shared Stuart monarchy.<sup>16</sup> Although that tie was severed with the king's head in January 1649, the question remained whether a dynastic tie must be replaced with something else. The Republic's brutal assertion of its power against the Scots in 1650 and beyond has, in hindsight, assumed an air of inevitability. Yet at the end of his 1648 campaign against Scots royalists Cromwell seems to have hoped to leave the northern kingdom in the hands of the Earl of Argyll and his radical Presbyterian allies, whose animosity to the supporters of Charles I showed itself in that remarkable exercise in proscription, the Act of Classes.<sup>17</sup> In such calculations, the English army and its civilian allies would then presumably

<sup>14</sup> *Diary of Thomas Burton*, 4:238–39, 241–42.

<sup>15</sup> Symptomatic is the way the debates in Richard Cromwell's Parliament on Scottish and Irish representation began fiercely with Scotland and then trailed away when members turned to Ireland. These debates, which seemed then and now almost interminable, take up much of vol. 4 of *Diary of Thomas Burton*.

<sup>16</sup> I say "primarily" since there were, of course, linguistic bonds between England and at least part of Scotland, and ties of geographic proximity too; but the latter could lead to friction (and had for centuries) as much as to friendliness.

<sup>17</sup> Cromwell may have pushed Argyll in the direction of proscription; yet proscription was hardly foreign to Scottish history in these troubled years. For Cromwell's hopes of Argyll, see his letter to Hammond, in *Writings and Speeches*, 1:677–78; the letter is quoted at some length in D. Stevenson, "Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland," in *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution*, ed. J. Morrill (London, 1990), p. 154. Cromwell may have been willing to observe constitutional proprieties, for he warned the army council in March 1649 that though developments to the north were ominous, "In the Kingdome of Scotland, you cannott soe well take notice of what is done"; but he went on to predict that "this their anger (though without any quarrelling of ours with them) will returne into their owne bosomes" (C. H. Firth, ed., *Clarke Papers*, 4 vols. [London, 1891–1901], 2:203).

have been left free to pursue in England and its dependency, Ireland, a settlement without Charles I.<sup>18</sup> But these hopes, difficult enough of achievement, were rendered unattainable when on news of Charles I's execution Argyll promptly had the younger Charles Stuart proclaimed king of Great Britain, rather than merely king of Scotland.<sup>19</sup> The Rumpers, who during the last ten years might have been expected to have recognized the Covenanters' deep commitment to a shared British ecclesiastical—and hence political—destiny, were appalled. The likely consequences of the Scottish proclamation were not lost even on Scottish observers. Robert Baillie, who had been one of the Scottish deputation in London in the 1640s, despaired, "One Act of our lamentable Tragedy being ended, we are entering again upon the scene"; one of his correspondents, equally gloomy, predicted, "Let Scotland chuse what syde they please, that poor land sal be the seat of war, by al appearance, this summer."<sup>20</sup> The prophecy missed by twelve months, since both the Rump and the young king judged Ireland more urgent. Yet even then the march of the English sword from conquests in Ireland to conquests in Scotland was by no means as inexorable as it is made to seem in the most famous depiction of these months, Andrew Marvell's "An Horatian Ode upon Cromwel's Return from Ireland."<sup>21</sup>

The Rump's posture toward what it declared to be the aggression of Scotland's proclamation of Charles II was at first firmly limited. The

<sup>18</sup> Thus, the Rump's 1649 act abolishing kingly power and prerogative spoke only of England and Ireland (C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, 3 vols. [London, 1911], 2:18–20).

<sup>19</sup> *Acts done and past in the Second Session of the Second Triennial Parliament of King Charles I . . . and in the First Parliament of our Sovereign Lord Charles the II* (Edinburgh, 1649), act 14, pp. 35–36: "Proclamation of Charles the Second, King of great Britain, France and Ireland." For the long-standing Covenanter interest in the entity of Britain, see below, pp. 477–78. Argyll, as head of the Campbells, may have had his own ancestral axe to grind; see esp. Alexander Grant, "Scotland's 'Celtic Fringe' in the Later Middle Ages," in *The British Isles, 1100–1500: Comparisons, Contrasts and Connections*, ed. R. R. Davies (Edinburgh, 1988), p. 122; see also Jane E. A. Dawson, "Two Kingdoms or Three? Ireland in Anglo-Scottish Relations in the Middle of the Sixteenth Century," in *Scotland and England, 1286–1815*, ed. Roger A. Mason (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 113–38.

<sup>20</sup> D. Laing, ed., *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*, 3 vols. (Edinburgh, 1881–82), 3:66, 68 (hereafter, cited as *Letters of Baillie*). It was doubtless with similar thoughts in mind that some prominent Scots urged that the young Charles Stuart be content with only a Scottish kingdom; his response was to threaten to hang them; see H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Scotland and the Puritan Revolution," in his *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change* (London, 1967), pp. 415–16.

<sup>21</sup> H. M. Margoliouth, *The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1952), 1:87–90.

government's decision in the summer of 1650 to embark on a preemptive strike against the Scottish kingdom—a decision that drove the lord general, Fairfax, into resignation—may have been unusually assertive for a regime whose habitual posture was simply reactive.<sup>22</sup> But the Republic was by no means casting expansionist eyes northward. The declarations issued by both Parliament and army that summer insisted that England only sought punishment of the guilty, security against yet another Scottish invasion of her soil, and reparations for the last<sup>23</sup>—indeed, Cromwell himself continued to sing that tune long after the dramatic victory at Dunbar, up to the very eve of the Scots' collapse in August–September 1651.<sup>24</sup> The English authorities left the matter of Scotland's precise constitutional shape studiously vague. Not until its declaration of June 1650—and then almost as an afterthought—did Parliament propose “the furthering of a just Freedom, where God shall minister the opportunitie.”<sup>25</sup>

Such vagueness amounted not simply to a failure of thought but rather to a positive evasion of the issue. As late as October 1650, more than a month after Dunbar, the posture of the council of state remained fundamentally nonexpansionist. The council then responded to a stalemate in the north that was constitutional almost as much as it was military by suggesting that the Scots go their own, monarchist, way—though with a king who would be less threatening to England than was Charles Stuart. The council's preferred candidate for the Scottish throne was Charles's younger brother, the Duke of Gloucester. Cromwell for his part warned that the price for Scotland's retention of its independence and its crown would have to extend beyond the

<sup>22</sup> See, generally, B. Worden, *The Rump Parliament* (Oxford, 1973).

<sup>23</sup> *A Declaration of the Parliament of England upon the Marching of the Armie into Scotland* (London, June 26, 1650); *A Declaration of the Army of England upon their March into Scotland* (London, July 19, 1650); *A Declaration of the English Army now in Scotland* (London, August 8, 1650). Acceptance of the constitutional independence of the Scots probably accounts for the near universal readiness of Englishmen in Rump circles to accord Charles Stuart the title “King of Scots” in 1649–50 and even beyond. The English posture makes Argyll's determination to crown Charles Stuart something other than merely king of Scotland all the more remarkable; more than anything, perhaps, it reveals the depth of Scottish commitment to Britain, for which see below, pp. 471, 476–78. I am grateful to John Morrill for discussions on this point.

<sup>24</sup> Clarke MSS, vol. 20, fol. 28, Worcester College, Oxford; *Writings and Speeches*, 2:350.

<sup>25</sup> *A Declaration of the Parliament of England upon the Marching of the Armie into Scotland* (London, June 26, 1650), p. 9. Marchamont Nedham, by now ardently republican, surely went farther in thoughts of an imposed settlement than the Rump intended when he expressed the hope that “the poor People will willingly shake hands with us, in defence of the two Commonweales of England and Scotland” (*Mercurius Politicus* [July 17–25, 1650], p. 111).

promises of nonintervention in England the Kirk's leaders offered, to include the banishment or perpetual imprisonment of Charles.<sup>26</sup> Such plans came to nothing, for the Kirk no longer held the initiative in Scotland as it had before Dunbar, and in the following years the Republic formulated a bold solution to the old problem of the existence in the British isles of three separate states.<sup>27</sup> Yet the reluctance with which the Rump and its successors developed a policy toward Scotland is unmistakable.<sup>28</sup> The English regime had far too many problems to risk plunging vaingloriously into a Scottish morass. The Scottish proclamation of Charles Stuart as a "British" king, a proclamation that can only be seen as the fruit of intense Scottish commitment to a British ideal, therefore provoked an English invasion that would not otherwise have happened. Argyll's must have been one of the most fateful gestures in all the long and sorry history of Anglo-Scottish dealings.

Though the English authorities certainly had abundant interest in lulling their opponents by concealing hidden agendas, their protestations of disinterest were in line with what can be sensed of opinion in the country. In 1650 Thomas Violet, addressing the committee on trade, warned correctly of the economic and financial dangers of foreign military entanglements, that all would be "carried away into Scotland." A year later, in the immediate

<sup>26</sup> On October 18, 1650, the Rumper Philip Lord Lisle, a member of the Council of State, wrote to his father, the Earl of Leicester, "This evening the Councell resolved to offer theire advice to the Parlement that the Duke of Glocester should be sent into Scotland, the Kirke now wanting a King" (*Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports, De L'Isle and Dudley*, 6 vols. [London, 1925–66], 6:485; for Cromwell, see *Letters of Baillie*, 3:113). One republican seems to have found Charles Stuart particularly dangerous because of his tutor, who was of course Thomas Hobbes; even so, a mere two months before the Scots invaded in the summer of 1651 another radical republican could write of the king of the Scots, "They have him, and have enthroned him, let them keep him to themselves" (*The False Brother; or, A New Map of Scotland*, [London, 1650], p. 41 [hereafter, cited as *The False Brother*]; R. F., *The Scot Arraigned* [London, 1651], p. 10 [The bookseller George Thomason dated his copy of this pamphlet to June 16]).

<sup>27</sup> That the Republic was aware of the continuities between its own hostility to the powers of the Scottish nobility and Kirk and the policies of the kings who preceded it is suggested by the remarks of Col. John Jones in Dublin (J. Mayer, "Inedited Letters of Cromwell, Bradshaw, Col. Jones and other Regicides," *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, n.s., 1 [1860–61]: 192).

<sup>28</sup> The tendency of the protector's council to leave law courts and councils inquorate in Dublin and in Leith and Edinburgh was interpreted by Scots as a considered policy of annexation, as evidence that they were seen as "no nation" and not to be accorded their own government (T. C. Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland* [Oxford, 1975], pp. 16, 19–22; F. D. Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland* [Edinburgh, 1979], p. 211; *Letters of Baillie*, 3:288). In fact, it was of a piece with the generally lethargic English response to Scotland and Ireland.

aftermath of Worcester, the Essex minister Ralph Josselin was performing similar calculations, writing worriedly in his diary, "To destroy the nations were barbarous, to plant them with English colonies is very hard and unlikely, and Scotland will not invite our men, and yett this must be done besides good garrisons."<sup>29</sup> English sources in fact reveal singularly little enthusiasm for the Scottish venture in its early months. The Herefordshire grand jury encouraged the Rump in its twin aims of security and reparations, since the Scots had "for many ages heretofore bin infesters and Invaders of this Common-wealth, to the great impov'rishment of it."<sup>30</sup> But the unusual nature of such an expression doubtless accounts for its airing in the press.

What the Rumpers heard more generally was a chorus of denunciation of the Scots—in itself grist enough to the regime's mill—coupled with calls that they be left well alone. Hostility from English Presbyterians toward moves to subordinate their coreligionists to the north was to be expected;<sup>31</sup> but there were less partisan grounds for doubt too. Though the author of *The False Brother*, one of the most impressive publications of 1650, began irenically, wishing that the Scots "may . . . live as happily without us, as we can do without them," his consciousness of "the disproportion between our Nation and Scotland, in our enjoyments, and priviledges" led him to the forceful conclusion that "we can get nothing worth our labour and cost in Scotland." In no way, he argued, could "power and domination" be the English aim in invading Scotland, "seeing it would cost us more to gain such a power, then ever we could get by the most intire communion in it; and it would be a sad exchange for English men to remove from such a fertile and flourishing Nation, to make a plantation of the fag end of the Creation."<sup>32</sup> As late as November 1651 Col. John Jones agreed, writing from Dublin that the English demand for reparations would require the payment of "a greater account than all Scotland is worth."<sup>33</sup> The diatribes against the barren, inhospitable land to the north and against the brutality, bestiality, and hypocrisy of its inhabitants,

<sup>29</sup> J. Thirsk and J. P. Cooper, eds., *Seventeenth-Century Economic Documents* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 58–59; A. Macfarlane, ed., *The Diary of Ralph Josselin* (London, 1976), p. 263.

<sup>30</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (August 15–22, 1650), p. 174.

<sup>31</sup> See the report of the failure of attempts in July 1650 to raise an infantry regiment in Lancashire: "the bold Dragoons of the Clergy are drawn up to oppose the Levy, crying out Heresie and Schism, the Covenant and Damnation" (*Mercurius Politicus* [July 18–25, 1650], p. 98; see also E. Axon, ed., *Oliver Heywood's Life of John Angier of Denton* [Manchester, 1937], p. 67; R. Parkinson, ed., *Autobiography of Henry Newcome*, 2 vols. [Manchester, 1852], 1:31, 33).

<sup>32</sup> *The False Brother*, sig. A2 and pp. 35, 63.

<sup>33</sup> Mayer, p. 192.

which run as an unceasing refrain through all the newspapers from the moment the army crossed the border, could have left the Rumpers in little doubt of the sentiments in articulate quarters about a closer approach to the Scots.<sup>34</sup> It is no wonder, then, that the first mention in the press of wider war aims should have been so hesitant and apologetic. Four months after Dunbar an army spokesman in Edinburgh pleaded for support for “the subduing of this People, who have so often prejudiced the People of England by making Inroads, and spoiling the Inhabitants; what say you, if their necessities and our own carry us on so farr, as to see the necessity of making this a Province to England . . . there being little hope of security upon other Terms?”<sup>35</sup>

And indeed, the initial response of the republic to its next great victory, in the late summer of 1651, was simply to seek to dismember its helpless neighbor. England would, as the aborted bill put it that autumn, appropriate “so much of Scotland as is now under the Power of the Forces of this Commonwealth,” presumably in the confidence that internecine feuding and strategic garrisons would neutralize any danger from the Scots in the remaining portion. When the newspapers had stressed that for the most part the countryside “to Edinburgh”—the region firmly under English control—“is as fertile for Corn as any part of England,” such a decision was rational enough.<sup>36</sup> It was also entirely consistent with a strategic vision that had tantalized in turn Edward I, Edward III, and Edward IV and with the Rump’s earlier insistence that England’s war aims were security and reparations. As Cromwell had found to his cost in the demoralizing months both before and after Dunbar, the line between the two Firths, of Forth and Clyde, by way of Stirling, was eminently defensible; and the rich lands south of it would, once they had recovered from the devastation wreaked on them, amply repay England for what any Scots forces had done to the northern counties between 1640 and 1648. But by November the Rump’s plans had changed decisively.<sup>37</sup>

The Rump in the winter of 1651–52 opted for an incorporating union of Scotland with England, instead of annexing it as a conquered province, and in so doing wrote one more chapter into the Scots’ catalog of English hypocri-

<sup>34</sup> Virtually any issue of the nonroyalist press in 1650–51 tells the same story; undoubtedly the finest version is the letter from an English soldier the week after Dunbar printed in *A Perfect Diurnal* (September 16–23, 1650) and reprinted in S. R. Gardiner, *Letters and Papers illustrating the Relations between Charles II and Scotland in 1650* (Edinburgh, 1894), pp. 136–40. This shows at great length how the Scottish nation regularly broke all ten of the Commandments.

<sup>35</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (January 2–9, 1650–51), p. 565.

<sup>36</sup> *Journals of the House of Commons* (London, 1742–), 7:14; *Mercurius Politicus* (October 3–10, 1650), p. 298.

<sup>37</sup> The bill for the dismemberment of Scotland was still alive on October 25, 1651. Clarke MSS, vol. 20, fol. 28, Worcester College, Oxford.

sies.<sup>38</sup> The decision, taken under Cromwell's prompting,<sup>39</sup> has been plausibly presented as a response to the realization that only such a policy would block Charles Stuart's efforts to reorganize in what he sought to make his northern kingdom. Incorporation was also urged at the time as cheaper in the long run than forcible annexation.<sup>40</sup> And in the threatening climate of the 1650s, with its recurrent fears of a Franco-Spanish alliance against republican England, even the most phlegmatic could see the defensive advantages of union. In union lay security, as the lord chief justice was to remind the Norfolk assizes in 1657<sup>41</sup> and as speaker after speaker intoned in the debates in Richard Cromwell's Parliament. Thomas Scot the commonwealthsman, though opposed then to the continued sitting of the members for Scotland and Ireland, was nevertheless able to observe that at most a single voice had been heard raised in the Rump against the principle of union.<sup>42</sup> But however powerful the defensive arguments, the new policy also had more positive appeal.

Paradoxically, incorporation affirmed the English sense of themselves, and in particular of their generosity. What might be called the orthodox self-image of the English was proclaimed by the solicitor general at the treason trial of the Presbyterian minister Christopher Love in the summer of 1651: Love had intended that "the free, and noble, and magnanimous people of England, should be made vassals and tributaries to the Scots Nation." Love's proved an unpardonable offense, for, as a pamphleteer wrote, "they are our inferiors,

<sup>38</sup> The consent that union required, and that the Rumpers and Cromwell in turn professed to seek, accorded ill with political and military realities; that so few in England seem to have noticed the discrepancy is a telling reflection of unthinking English assumptions of superiority. Nowhere is the emptiness of English claims to consent better revealed than in the highly effective quartering of nine companies of troops on Glasgow, whose magistrates and ministers had had the temerity to reject the "Tender" of union. The records of English policy and Scottish response at this time are generally collected in C. S. Terry, ed., *The Cromwellian Union* (Edinburgh, 1902), passim, and esp. pp. 35 and n. 118. One of the few Englishmen to challenge the myth was the commonwealthsman John Hobart, who pointed out in 1659 that Scotland had "had no Nationall Representment, nor as I humbly thinke was in a Condition to make Agreement, but to accept Conditions Our Army having wholly subdued them" ("Mr. Hubbard's Speech in Parliament 21 March 1658[9]," uncataloged MSS, unfoliated, University of Illinois Library). I am grateful to James Robertson for calling my attention to this document.

<sup>39</sup> See below, pp. 464–65.

<sup>40</sup> L. M. Smith, "Scotland and Cromwell: A Study in Early-Modern Government" (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1987), p. 58; for Cromwell's role, see Dow (n. 28 above), pp. 30–31. For the argument of economy see, e.g., *The Antiquity of England's Superiority over Scotland* (London, 1652), pp. 3–4.

<sup>41</sup> British Library, Additional MSS 25276, esp. fol. 15.

<sup>42</sup> *Diary of Thomas Burton* (n. 13 above), 4:136.

and we a free people.”<sup>43</sup> The subtlety of the Spanish in devising forms of subjugation and subordination was something of a byword.<sup>44</sup> But, judged one commentator, “if we look on the English as Conquerors, we finde them herein also generous, and that in all places where they have been Masters, they have shown the truest effects of commendable and noble dispositions.” In contrast to Spanish conduct in the Indies, “Where shall we finde a People Conquered by Arms, used with more moderation and gentleness, then the Scots are at this time by the English? If these have overcome them, they have recompenced it, with introducing more Liberty and greater Priviledges then they had before.”<sup>45</sup> The argument of benevolence formed a central element in England’s “British” ideology just as it was to do when Britons later developed the theme of “the white man’s burden.”<sup>46</sup>

Assumptions of English paternalism arose easily enough when the objects of English attentions were the Gaelic-speaking Catholic Irish, for whom even confinement in proximity to English settlements was—if it was not foolhardy—an act of kindness and betterment.<sup>47</sup> But the English had had unwelcome experience during the 1640s of Scots “blue-bonnets” too. Impressions formed in the earlier wars were only confirmed by repeated news stories during the early stages of the conquest of the sheer credulity, superstition, and backwardness of the Scots—especially in face of the eclipses of 1652—and of the “peevish insolent obstinacie” of those who inexplicably preferred to be shot on the spot rather than be marched captive into England.

<sup>43</sup> *The Whole Traill of Mr Love* (London, 1652: recte 1651 [Thomason dates this September 1]), p. 17; R. F., *The Scot Arraigned* (n. 26 above), p. 11. The solicitor-general’s outburst obviously flowed from the same well of national passion that Cromwell had drawn on when he denounced those responsible for the war of 1648, who had sought “to vassalise us to a foreign nation” (*Writings and Speeches* [n. 12 above], 1:691).

<sup>44</sup> See, e.g., *Diary of Thomas Burton*, 4:131.

<sup>45</sup> R[ichard] H[jawkins], *A Discourse of the Nationall Excellencies of England* (London, 1657), p. 192. The last argument echoed the retort of Marchamont Nedham to the hypothetical question whether England would have accepted a union so tendered by the Scots: “Yes, without doubt, and be glad of it too, if England could reap so much benefit by an Incorporation with Scotland, as Scotland will have by England” (*Mercurius Politicus* [January 22–29, 1651–52], p. 1379).

<sup>46</sup> See too the stress on England’s generosity, its willingness to “offre England,” in an earlier unionist appeal, that of 1548: Edward Duke of Somerset, *An Epistle Exhortatorie . . . To the nobilitie, and counsailors, gentlemen and the commons, and all others the inhabitants of the realme of Scotland*, Early English Text Society, extra ser., 17 (London, 1872), pp. 238–46, esp. p. 241.

<sup>47</sup> See Milton’s contempt for the Irish who had so often in the past rejected the chance “to improve and wax more civill by a civilizing Conquest” (*Observations upon the Articles of Peace* [1649], in Don M. Wolfe et al., eds., *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, 8 vols. [New Haven, Conn., 1953–82], 3:304).

The English program in Scotland could therefore also be presented as one of “Civill proceedings against Incivillity.”<sup>48</sup> Such a representation was doubtless all the more convincing after “many thousands of totterd Scots,” the remnants of the “Barbarians” defeated at Worcester, had been paraded through the city in September 1651.<sup>49</sup> Concession to such a people could only be an act of magnanimity, to be expected of the liberal English. The applause of the soldiers gathered around the Mercat Cross in Edinburgh to hear the reading of Parliament’s declaration of union in 1652 was a token of the army’s “complying with the parliament in their free conferring of liberty uppon a conquered people.” Rather more pointed was the demand of the governor of Ruthven Castle, urging the leaders of the Badenoch region to submit in 1653, “Is not the State of England imediately about to incorporate and make yow one free Commonwealth with themselves, and what greater favour could they cast upon yow?”<sup>50</sup> Those involved in the conquest of Scotland, from Cromwell down, certainly prided themselves on the philanthropic aspects of that overthrow of Scottish Kirk and nobility whose strategic advantages were so plain to see;<sup>51</sup> but the very act of incorporation was a token that English hearts were in the right place.

Union, however, did more for the English than simply affirm their self-esteem. The suddenness and the scale of the Scottish collapse in the late summer of 1651—with the seizure of its government at Alyth proving as decisive as the destruction of its remaining army at Worcester—took Englishmen by surprise. What Cromwell saw as the “crowning mercy” others read more enthusiastically. Peter Sterry, one of Cromwell’s favorite divines, preached—under the patronage of one of Cromwell’s close allies, Sir Gilbert Pickering—the November 5 sermon to Parliament in 1651, at just the time when the republic’s policy was beginning to change. In this sermon Sterry held forth the union of the English and Scots churches as the necessary reformation of a north from which Christ would ride in his chariot, as foretold in Ezekiel and Revelations. “Is this then the Age? Is this the Land, in which

<sup>48</sup> Clarke MSS, vol. 24, fol. 25, Worcester College, Oxford. For examples of reports of the (allegedly) universal Scottish credulity and superstition, see *Mercurius Politicus* (March 18–25, 1652), p. 1476, and (April 1–8, 1652), p. 1520; for the suicidal “obstinacie” of captives, see (September 26–October 3, 1650), p. 279.

<sup>49</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (September 11–18, 1651), p. 1071. Disease quickly solved any problems of repatriation that might have arisen (H. F. Westlake, *St. Margaret’s Westminster* [London, 1914], p. 109).

<sup>50</sup> Clarke MSS, vol. 22, fol. 80, Worcester College, Oxford; C. H. Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth* (Edinburgh, 1895), p. 269.

<sup>51</sup> Stevenson, “Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland” (n. 17 above), p. 164. Such benefits were, of course, not confined to Scotland: see Cromwell’s determination “to hold forth and maintain the lustre and glory of English liberty” to the Irish (*Writings and Speeches*, 2:205).

our Lord Jesus ascends from the North? Doth he now call up the cloudes, and winds to minister to him? Doth he now from hence begin, as a Bridegroom to come forth from his Chamber, as a Giant, or Warriour refresht with Wine, to run his race, unto the Ends of the Earth? . . . It is so. The Lord is upon his white-horses of divine discoveries." The time for winnowing, for the destruction of the old world, had come.<sup>52</sup>

Sterry was not alone—as indeed the invitation to him to preach and publish his sermon would suggest—in so typing the times. Henry Parker, who had been the most astute parliamentary propagandist of the 1640s, recognized the appeal of the Commonwealth's conquests in the north to "the Chiliaists."<sup>53</sup> And in the country, Ralph Josselin's long years of millennialist excitement began, not with the execution of the king, which so aroused the Fifth Monarchy men, but rather with England's expansion the following year. Though he lacked the animosity of Cromwell, of Sterry, of Pickering, for the Presbyterianism of the Scots, he was convinced of the religious significance of the reshaping of Britain. It was in the autumn after Dunbar that he suspected "that god was beginning to ruine the kingdome of the earth, and bringing christs kingdome in, and wee English should bee very instrumentall therein." As the young Charles Stuart's last strongholds in the Channel Islands fell at the end of 1651 Josselin foresaw the fall of the earthly city, "except wee say its not compleate untill all the appendices of this crowne in Ireland and Scotland are reduced which wee expect shortly."<sup>54</sup>

The case for unification was therefore driven by a powerful religious imperative. Although others were soon to put their own, secular, gloss on matters, the Rump's committee for Scottish affairs, which drew up the policy and the Tender by which it was offered to the Scots, was composed not of the classical republicans who might have been thought the natural constituency of a program of expansionism,<sup>55</sup> but overwhelmingly of Independents and army

<sup>52</sup> P. Sterry, *England's Deliverance from the Northern Presbytery Compared with its Deliverance from the Roman Papacy* (London, 1651), pp. 44–45, and also pp. 26–27, 32–33, 41–42.

<sup>53</sup> Henry Parker, *Scotlands Holy War* (London, 1651), pp. 23, 65.

<sup>54</sup> Macfarlane, ed. (n. 29 above), pp. 220, 267 (for Josselin's sympathy for the Scots, see p. 217).

<sup>55</sup> See Blair Worden, "Classical Republicanism and the Puritan Revolution," in *History and Imagination*, ed. H. Lloyd-Jones, V. Pearl, and B. Worden (London, 1981), pp. 182–200, and "Andrew Marvell, Oliver Cromwell, and the Horatian Ode," in *Politics of Discourse*, ed. K. Sharpe and S. Zwicker (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 147–80. Although they had not originated the policy of union, classical republicans may have taken it more seriously than others—thus, Henry Neville protested in 1659 at the government's practice of foisting its nominees onto Scottish parliamentary constituencies, which "is absolutely to enslave and reduce them to a province" (*Diary of Thomas Burton* [n. 13 above], 4:188).

officers.<sup>56</sup> In September 1651 Cromwell indicated his own preference “for making it on[e] nation” rather than “a conquest,”<sup>57</sup> and this, with the composition of the English commission appointed in late October to go to Scotland to set union in train, points still more clearly to a policy conceived by the saints and the soldiers.<sup>58</sup> Those on the receiving end of the new policy had few doubts, hearing religious notes in the commissioners’ explanation of their mission. Thus, John Nicoll, Glasgow’s agent in Edinburgh, excoriated the conquerors who hoped “that the name of a Nationall Church may perische fra under Hevin and Britane”; he seems also to have detected millennial undertones to the terms in which the Tender of Union was offered to his compatriots: “So excellent a blessing of God, as, since the world was, our predicesouris in this yland nevir tasted the lyke; and though the present generatioun do smart and suffer in this chaynge, yit the efter ages sall blis the Maker of heavin and earth, quho in his appoynted tyme hes brocht this great work to ane happie period.”<sup>59</sup> Union in the 1650s had a religious appeal, just as it had had for James VI and I, with his dreams of Christian unity. Indeed, for all James’s eloquence, union received perhaps its finest accolade in the republican years, in the Shakespearean tribute paid by the deeply spiritual Sussex ironmaster Samuel Gott during the debate on the sitting of Scots and Irish representatives in Richard Cromwell’s Parliament: “The four seas do environ this happy island, as the four rivers did the garden of Eden. . . . This Union must be preserved by natural means, and not by force.”<sup>60</sup>

<sup>56</sup> The committee of thirty-six appointed on September 9, 1651, for drawing up a bill of annexation—a committee that was eventually to concoct a rather different measure—contained only three of the committed classical republicans in the House. The proportion held in the new committee appointed on December 24 for better effecting one clause in the instructions for the commissioners to Scotland: the twelve were Lords Commissioners Whitelocke and Lisle, Marten, Sir Henry Mildmay, Nicholas Love, Strickland, Lord Grey, Vane, Carew, Major General Harrison, Alderman Allen (*Journals of the House of Commons*, 7:14, 36).

<sup>57</sup> After a year of campaigning in Scotland Cromwell at least seems to have worked out the options, for he then insisted that support from “the honest party” in Scotland was essential to a policy of union: “utherwayes they would gouverne us as Irland and a conquest” (*Diary of Johnston of Wariston* [n. 8 above] 2:143).

<sup>58</sup> The commissioners were Lord Chief Justice St. John, Sir Henry Vane, Maj. Richard Salwey, Col. George Fenwick, Major General Lambert, Major General Deane, Alderman Robert Titchborne, Lieutenant General Monck (*ibid.*, 7:30).

<sup>59</sup> J. Nicoll, *A Diary of Public Transactions* (Edinburgh, 1836), pp. 63, 85. Such tones do not characterize the official documents of the Tender.

<sup>60</sup> *Diary of Thomas Burton*, 4:134–35. Gott made clear that he did not exclude Ireland from his earthly paradise, for he held that the one-sidedness of England’s relations with Ireland accounted for “the great tumults in Ireland.” The same debate called forth yet another poetic effusion: “We are one clod of earth. Neptune kisses our shore on every side” (4:145).

Although the religious radicals had fostered it, and although Gott and others might vest it with spiritual significance, union was nevertheless inseparably associated with the sword, in its potential as well as its origins. Those elemental forces that Marvell saluted in his “Horatian Ode” on the forward march of “restless Cromwel”<sup>61</sup> are evident in the cry of one of William Clarke’s equally restless army correspondents in the spring of 1652: “Wee shall rust heere for want of action, but this summer will bee spent in settling the 3 nations[;] against the next summer wee may thinke of action elsewhere.”<sup>62</sup> Similar confidence resounds in the posturings of armchair warriors in the 1650s, who pointed to Rome’s failure to conquer Scotland as evidence of England’s superiority to that empire, and as the warrant for their own predictions of glory.<sup>63</sup> The domestic as well as the external possibilities of the moment are apparent in the hundred pages of panegyric written in 1652 by Thomas Manley to the “Lord Generall of Great Brittain,” entitled *Veni; Vidi; Vici*.

In the history of the revolution that spread from Whitehall to engulf the highlands and islands, the excitement born of the British conquests formed the matrix for a major ideological innovation—an imperialism rooted in the new British polity.<sup>64</sup> This was compounded of the British concerns of the saints and of the rather more expansionist outlook of the classical republicans. Indeed, even the army of saints, as it moved beyond the border, seems to have had a Roman model partly in view.<sup>65</sup> But the most systematic thought occurred elsewhere. Marchamont Nedham, the unsaintly editor of the government’s newspaper, *Mercurius Politicus*, first conjured “that prodigious Empire” of the Roman republic in the New Year of 1651–52, in the aftermath

<sup>61</sup> Andrew Marvell, Margoliouth, (n. 21 above), p. 87.

<sup>62</sup> Clarke MSS, vol. 22, fol. 81, Worcester College, Oxford. Such energy was, of course, to find employment in Cromwell’s “Western Design,” which he justified to his council in July 1654 in not dissimilar terms, of the “work” to be done “in the world” (*Writings and Speeches* [n. 12 above], 3:370).

<sup>63</sup> See, e.g., William Burton, *A Commentary on Antoninus his Itinerary* (1658); H[awkins] (n. 45 above) pp. 1–11, 77–78.

<sup>64</sup> A strong case has recently been made for the origins in Cromwell’s Protectorate, in “the imperial moment” that extended from late 1654 to 1656 and encompassed the Western Design and the first flush of the Spanish war, of the concept and language of the British empire; as will be apparent, that argument overlooks developments during the Commonwealth. D. Armitage, “The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Languages of Empire,” *Historical Journal* 35 (1992): 531–55, esp. 533.

<sup>65</sup> Thus, army headquarters at Leith in 1652 spoke of the soldiers’ “tents or colony” (Clarke MSS, vol. 24, fol. 3, Worcester College, Oxford). On the whole, however, the army command in Scotland viewed its exploits in providential terms—see especially the discussions early in 1653 of a projected regimental history, and the suggestions for a similar effort in Ireland (Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth* [n. 50 above], pp. 75–76; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1652–1653*, PRO, p. 194).

of the battle of Worcester.<sup>66</sup> Admittedly, he found little glory in such poor opponents as the Scots; rather, the particular excellence of the founders of Rome, “that wondrous Empire that overshadowed the World,” had been the fact that “their first Conquests were laid in the ruin of mighty Nations, and such as were every jot as free as themselves.” Nedham then went on to glance unmistakably at the Dutch, a new Carthage, as suitable victims for this second imperial Roman republic.<sup>67</sup> Yet however much Nedham despised the Scots, they proved crucial to the classical republicans’ vision. The edition of John Selden’s *Mare clausum* that Nedham brought out in 1652 to justify the Commonwealth’s war with the Dutch—an edition that, as has recently been shown, provided the founding text for the new maritime empire—made the point graphically, for its frontispiece trumpeted Cromwell’s first, British, conquests on which Britannia’s rule of the seas was to be based.<sup>68</sup> The gesture was repeated time after time, if less elegantly, in the following years.<sup>69</sup>

The most famous of all classical republican texts, James Harrington’s *Oceana*, published in 1656 at the height of the controversy over the meaning of Cromwell’s Western Design, most clearly reveals the role of the union of the commonwealths in the new imperialism.<sup>70</sup> The book begins, in its introduction, with an account of the present situation of Marpesia (Scotland) and Panopea (Ireland) and the contribution they could make to Oceana. Marpesia is “the dry nurse of a populous and hardy people”; now, with “the yoke of the Nobility . . . broken by the Common-wealth of Oceana”—a reference to what became the cornerstone of English policy in Scotland after 1650—it will be “an inexhaustible Magazeen of Auxiliaries.” The theme is

<sup>66</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (December 25, 1651–January 1, 1652), p. 1304. The role of the battle in generating a new optimism is clear in his editorial of the week of September 18–25, pp. 1077–79.

<sup>67</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (January 15–22, 1651–52), pp. 1350–51. The part played by the Dutch in the thought of the classical republicans casts an interesting light on Shaftesbury’s famous “*Delenda est Carthago*” rhetoric of the next reign; I am grateful to John Morrill for this suggestion. For another perspective on the relationship between the Dutch and empire, see Steven Pincus, “England and the World in the 1650s,” in *Revolution and Restoration*, ed. John Morrill (London, 1992), pp. 129–47.

<sup>68</sup> Armitage, pp. 533–35. Furthermore, while Nedham had in the New Year of 1652 turned his gaze on the Netherlands rather than Scotland, it was in a Scottish context that he wrote grandly of “the Parliament of Great Britaine” (*Mercurius Politicus* [January 22–29, 1651–52], p. 1369).

<sup>69</sup> See esp. H[awkins], pp. 232–33; Michael Hawke, *The Right of Dominion, and Property of Liberty* (London, 1655), pp. 86–87.

<sup>70</sup> There can be little doubt of the imperialist fervor engendered during the period of the Western Design, or of the dreams spawned then of imperial status for Cromwell; but Armitage fails to consider the British element in the title “first emperor of Greate Britaine, and the isles thereunto belonging, allways Caesar, etc.” that was accorded by rumor (Armitage, pp. 531–32).

taken up yet more emphatically in the Lord Archon's closing speech to his council, which heralds the Marpesian auxiliaries as a "greater revenue unto you then if you had the Indies."<sup>71</sup> Harrington here seems to be looking to Scotland's recent role as a furnisher of armies for repeated invasions of England and Ireland, and of regiments too in the service of every European power.<sup>72</sup> And if the fate of Scotland may have done much to shape Harrington's outlook, the same can be said for Ireland. Of course, the settlement of Ireland by emigrants, and particularly by soldiers, from the mainland after 1652 was central to Harrington's theme of an expansionist republic of citizen-soldiers; but there is a still greater topicality in the introduction's discussion of Ireland. Here Ireland/Panopea is linked to the admission of the Jews, so lively an issue in 1655; Harrington laments that the occasion was not taken to turn the country over to that people who above all would have made of it "an inestimable treasure" and of Oceana a true "Commonwealth for increase."<sup>73</sup> The pressure of such topical themes in the text suggests that the union of Britain, and the problem of what to make of it, was as important a stimulus to Harrington as the domestic context, the inception of the Cromwellian protectorate.<sup>74</sup>

The imperial claims were scarcely the preserve of doctrinaire Harringtonians. Even in Scotland, hardly the beneficiary, Robert Baillie could note that Cromwell's expansionist foreign policy, with the "high and advantageous designs" of Blake and Penn in distant oceans, "did much please the spirits of the vulgare."<sup>75</sup> Another convert was James Howell, formerly a devoted royalist, who had in 1650 dedicated his *Instructions and directions for forren Travell* to the young Charles Stuart in the hope that he would see "Brittain . . . by a Charles be made Imperiall." In his very successful *Som Sober Inspections* of 1655 Howell by no means abandoned his partisan past, for he congratulated Oliver throughout on his dissolution of the Long Parliament; but he went on to salute "his Highness, whom all Nations cry up for the Hero of the times"

<sup>71</sup> J. G. A. Pocock, ed., *The Political Works of James Harrington* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 159, 257, 315. See also the similar claims of another classical republican, H[awkins] (pp. 129–30).

<sup>72</sup> It was a role that Harrington might well have remembered from the negotiations in 1642 that sent a Scottish army off under English pay to suppress the Irish rebels, and that the Scottish deputies had themselves stressed when pleading with the Rump for milder terms in the negotiations for union in 1652 (*Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1652–1653*, PRO, p. 52, and see the remarks in R. Mitchison, *Lordship to Patronage: Scotland 1603–1745* [London, 1983], pp. 50–51).

<sup>73</sup> Pocock, ed., pp. 159–60.

<sup>74</sup> For that context, see now Armitage, pp. 546–53, as well as Pocock's introduction to Harrington's *Works*. Pocock saw rather more straightforward roles for Scotland and Ireland, as, respectively, the object of English libertarian attentions and the source of material support for English citizen-soldiers (Pocock, ed., p. 71).

<sup>75</sup> *Letters of Baillie* (n. 20 above), 3:291.

and whose victories over the Scots “did more than Roman Emperours, or after them, the Saxon, Danish, Norman, or English Kings cold ever do.”<sup>76</sup> George Wither began one of his most successful works with a paean to Oliver, “Lord, of the noblest of all Sovereign Stiles, / Of Britain’s Empire, Provinces, and Isles,” and though we might think few would have been converted by his execrable verse, the Protector at least seems to have taken him seriously.<sup>77</sup> Scholars have usually concentrated on the conservative appeal of a new Cromwellian monarchy; yet many at the time hankered also after imperial greatness. In 1655 the corporation of Harwich sent a petition of congratulations to the Lord Protector of the “British Jerusalem,”<sup>78</sup> and the rumors that Oliver would be made “Emperor of Great Britain”<sup>79</sup> speak to what contemporaries took to be a leading feature of the new regime. The potential was certainly not wholly lost on those who held power. In his closing speech at the treason trial of Gerard, Vowel, and Fox in June 1654 Lord Commissioner Lisle sought to heighten the guilt of the accused by pointing to the implications of the plot for the approaching Parliament, “never the like Parliament heard of for the interest of England, a Parliament for England, Scotland, and Ireland.” And the Protector himself ranked the achievements in Ireland and Scotland first among his government’s merits when appealing to his second parliament.<sup>80</sup> No reminder is needed that Cromwell passed by the opportunity to link his name, and a new style, with the new Britain; more remarkable is the failure of the republic in general to make more of the ideological and propaganda openings that its British conquests had created.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> James Howell, *Instructions and directions for forren Travell* (London, 1650), and *Som Sober Inspections* (London, 1655), pp. 179–81, 141. The impact of this work, and its plea for change, was such that it drove Marchamont Nedham to publish his unfortunately timed plea for a republic, *The Excellency of a Free State*, in 1656, just as the Protectorate was about to move a little farther toward the old order.

<sup>77</sup> G. Wither, *The Protector*, 2 eds. (London, 1655, 1656), sig. A2; for a (perhaps hopeful) glimpse of his relations to Oliver, see Hartlib MSS, “Ephemerides, 1655” (Turnbull transcripts, p. 92), Sheffield University Library.

<sup>78</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1655*, PRO, p. 46.

<sup>79</sup> Scotland’s emissaries to Whitehall in the summer of 1654 clearly expected such a move (*Diary of Johnston of Wariston* [n. 8 above], 2:268, 273. For a discussion of the climate of opinion favoring it, see J. M. Wallace, *Destiny His Choice* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 109–13; and now Armitage, *passim*).

<sup>80</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1654*, PRO, p. 240; D. Hirst, “The Lord Protector,” in Morrill, ed., *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (n. 17 above), pp. 122–23.

<sup>81</sup> The laments of the commonwealthsmen in Richard Cromwell’s Parliament for the lost glory of the Rump, while encompassing the Dutch war, suggest something of the emotive power of the British achievements (*Diary of Thomas Burton* [n. 13 above], vols. 3, 4, *passim*).

Both commonwealth and protectorate governments have often and justly been criticized for their ideological lameness; but their failure to exploit more purposively the new order can surely be traced to something other than mere pressure of events. English affectations of Britishness—then as, surely, now—were shallow, and the formalities of union and the glories of conquest did little to undermine a rooted English chauvinism. It is not insignificant that while Argyll proclaimed Charles II king of Great Britain, Oliver was proclaimed Lord Protector of the commonwealths of England, Scotland, and Ireland.<sup>82</sup> Like his compatriots, Oliver showed no willingness to follow an earlier Protector, Somerset, in offering the name of England as a sacrifice on the altar of union.<sup>83</sup> However much the state deemed itself a multiple commonwealth, policy remained strictly English;<sup>84</sup> and when most Englishmen spoke of “Great Britain” they unapologetically intended “England.”<sup>85</sup>

Indeed, the tendency to exclude neighbors increased in many quarters as contacts grew. Perhaps the classic example of the way familiarity bred distinction is provided by the dealings of the various inhabitants of the British isles on the complicated terrain of Ulster. Newspaper reports and even government pronouncements made a point of separating English settlers from the “British”—that is, Scottish—protestants also found there.<sup>86</sup> More predictable, but perhaps more troubling, was the way national prejudices had rooted themselves deeper in the troubles of the 1640s. There were those who could recognize that others had claims to rights; and when he read of the remorseless work done by the English army against Scots as well as Irish, Ralph Josselin asked gloomily, “What probability is their of continuing their

<sup>82</sup> Stevenson, “Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland” (n. 17 above), p. 180.

<sup>83</sup> Protector Somerset had protested his willingness “to leaue the name of the nacion . . . and to take the indifferent old name of Britaynes again” (*An Epistle Exhortatorie* [n. 46 above], p. 241).

<sup>84</sup> Both Protector and press saw foreign, colonial, and economic policy as a strictly English affair: see, e.g., *Mercurius Politicus* (August 16–23, 1655), pp. 5560–61, (November 1–8, 1655), pp. 5738–40, (November 22–29, 1655), pp. 5576–80.

<sup>85</sup> Striking, because uncontestatory, examples are provided by Sir Ralph Maddison, who in 1654 pleaded for the sovereignty of “the British-seas” by “Great Brittain” with a set of wholly English precedents, and by the very ecumenical Samuel Hartlib, who also meant “England” when he said “Britain”: R. Maddison, *Great Britains Remembrancer* (London, 1654), esp. pp. 40–42; [Samuel Hartlib], *A Plea for Gospel Communion . . . sued for by the Protestant Churches of Germanie, unto the Churches of Great Brittainie and Ireland* (London, 1654), preface and sig. a. Still more suggestive is the case of the future Charles II, who in 1654 styled himself “Kinge of Great Britane and Scotlande” (C. H. Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Protectorate* [Edinburgh, 1899], p. 31).

<sup>86</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (August 3–10, 1654), pp. 3671, 3672, 3673; see also Mayer (n. 27 above), pp. 184, 293. In other words, when Englishmen said “British” they meant the Scots, but when they said “Great Britain” they usually meant England.

command over them, for surely the seed of liberty will remain in those nations.”<sup>87</sup> But such scruples were rare. If the struggles of the 1640s were as much a war of three kingdoms as they were an English civil war, that may cast light on the relative politeness of the fighting among the English; but it also suggests those struggles may have intensified national hostilities. The widespread slur against the Scots, which likened their handing over of Charles I to Parliament in 1647 to Judas’s sale of Christ,<sup>88</sup> like the scale of the Cromwellian settlement of Ireland, speaks to the political consequences. The human consequences are evident in the notorious brutality shown to Irish prisoners of war; and as the squalid aftermaths of the battles of Preston and Worcester showed, the Scots were not immune to such prejudice.<sup>89</sup> Many in England would have sympathized with the complaint of a soldier indicted in the West Riding in 1651: “They charge me with killing of the woman, and she was but a Scotch woman . . . the women in Scotland had murdered many Englishmen, and . . . he would kill more of them if they came in his way.”<sup>90</sup> Indeed, even the relatively sensitive Colonel Lilburne could, when quartered in Scotland, refer as easily to “these kinde of cattell”<sup>91</sup> as officers of a more recent age spoke of “gooks.”

Other distinctions were less visceral but perhaps as influential in giving firmer shape to an English sense of identity. While the roots of Scottish affections for “Great Britain” have recently been traced to defenses against earlier English claims to overlordship,<sup>92</sup> English counterarguments grew increasingly articulate as the prospect of union loomed with the dynastic juncture of 1603.<sup>93</sup> Claims to nationhood were contestatory then, and they remained so.<sup>94</sup> One major product of the earlier controversy, *A Restitution of Decayed Intelligence, in Antiquities* by Richard Verstegen, who has been

<sup>87</sup> Macfarlane, ed. (n. 29 above), p. 263.

<sup>88</sup> See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London, 1651), chap. 3, for the most elegant version of that slur.

<sup>89</sup> Barbara Donagan, “Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War,” *Past and Present*, no. 118 (1988), pp. 65–95, esp. pp. 93–95.

<sup>90</sup> R. A. H. Bennett, “Enforcing the Law in Revolutionary England: Yorkshire, 1640–1660” (Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1988), pp. 202–3; see also Smith (n. 40 above), p. 141; and Gardiner (n. 34 above), pp. 134–40.

<sup>91</sup> Quoted in Dow (n. 28 above), p. 80.

<sup>92</sup> See esp. R. A. Mason, “Scotching the Brut: Politics, History and National Myth in Sixteenth-Century Britain,” in Mason, ed. (n. 19 above), pp. 60–84.

<sup>93</sup> Keith M. Brown, *Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 1603–1715* (New York, 1992), pp. 79–81.

<sup>94</sup> Thus, it seems likelier that James VI and I’s dissolution of England’s Society of Antiquaries in 1607 had to do with his dreams of Union, which received their final rebuff in that year, than with the antiquaries’ research into parliamentary and feudal liberties, to which the dissolution has often been unconvincingly tied.

called “the ancestor of the Gothicists in England,” was printed twice in the 1650s for an audience well primed to appreciate its case for the Teutonic origins and excellences of England.<sup>95</sup> The challenge posed by Scottish arguments ensured that even such unlikely bedfellows as John Milton and the Presbyterian lawyer William Prynne could in the middle years of the century make common cause in appropriating “Britain” to England.<sup>96</sup>

English exclusiveness thus became increasingly self-conscious in these years, in part at least under the pressure of “British” competition. The title of “Free-born Englishman” which John Lilburne the Leveller accorded to himself in the later 1640s had a wider normative appeal than is often appreciated. He was not simply setting himself up against “the Norman Yoke” of lordly power; he also had in view the Scots, the chief proponents of the religious tyranny he despised. His rhetoric was widely adopted. One distinctly non-Leveller attack on the Scots in 1650 denounced the northern kingdom for its long-standing conspiracy “to enslave and abase this Free-born Nation.”<sup>97</sup> At the end of the decade, Col. John Jones in Ireland trumpeted “the spirit of an army of Freeborne Englishmen,” while the Norwich election address of the fervent commonwealthsman John Hobart early in 1659 is a long blend of Lilburne and Colonel Blimp, a promise “to breake every Yoke from off our Neckes, and to restore and establish agayne the auncient Government, Rights and Libertyes of this English Nation.” The implications of Hobart’s position for Britain are apparent in his passionate appeal to “the old English jealousy” when he challenged the sitting of Scots and Irish MPs in Richard Cromwell’s Parliament.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Samuel Klier, *The Goths in England: A Study in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 115. Verstegen’s work was first published in 1605; it had new editions in 1628, 1634, and 1653, and was printed again in 1655.

<sup>96</sup> The title of Milton’s *History of Britain*, his history of England largely written in the late 1640s, is itself symptomatic; he made his assumptions more explicit elsewhere when he distinguished the feckless “Picts” from the “true Britons” who of course lived in what was to become England (John Milton, *Pro Populo Angli Defensio* [1651 and 1658], in Wolfe et al., eds. [n. 47 above], 4:509). Prynne’s appreciation of Verstegen is made clear by Klier, pp. 154–55.

<sup>97</sup> *The False Brother* (n. 26 above), p. 39. In a similar vein, the radical Lord Grey of Groby during the 1648 campaign against the Scots wrote an open letter to the Speaker of the House of Commons entitled “Old English Blood boyling afresh in Leicestershire Men” (J. Richards, “The Greys of Bradgate in the English Civil War,” *Transactions of the Leicestershire Archaeological and Natural History Society* 62 [1988]: 45).

<sup>98</sup> Mayer (n. 27 above), p. 271; Bodleian MSS, Tanner 51, fols. 16–18, 32–33, and 35–39. That Hobart actually spoke some such words in Parliament, rather than concocting an imaginary version on paper, is suggested by the account in *Diary of Thomas Burton* (n. 13 above), 4:103.

While the occasions for friction grew, little was published that might have engendered more informed and tolerant relations between the neighbors. The newspapers are full, at least until the collapse of Glencairn's revolt in late 1654, of military reports from Scotland, larded with haphazard efforts at recapturing Scottish place names and personal names—efforts that must have been all but incomprehensible to most readers who lacked maps. The newspapers are full too of partly gleeful, partly horrified, accounts of the endless bickering of the Scottish Presbyterian factions. But little of what might now be called “background” came off the presses. As the work of conquest proceeded in the summer of 1652 a few descriptive sentences appeared;<sup>99</sup> and the newly reduced Orkneys earned one derisive travelogue, written, revealingly, not just to gratify curiosity but “to provoke the appetite towards our government, whose bounds extend to above 150 miles” beyond the Scottish coast.<sup>100</sup> More ambitious was the carefully detailed account of the economic state of the Scottish coast produced for fiscal purposes for Broghill's council.<sup>101</sup> But even such pragmatic considerations left Scotland at a disadvantage. Wide-open spaces and the prospect of profit seem to have been needed to shift the reading public's gaze from its traditional preoccupations on the European mainland. Even Jamaica, which like Ireland had land up for grabs<sup>102</sup> (and where face needed to be saved after the Hispaniola disaster) was the subject of a number of descriptive pieces.<sup>103</sup> In Scotland, though senior army officers in the early days of conquest seem to have evaluated the range of Scottish landed estates pretty thoroughly, little profit was likely.<sup>104</sup> The daily contacts of the marketplace did little to increase familiarity, for English trade with Scotland was small in scale.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>99</sup> See the excerpts printed in Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth* (n. 50 above), pp. 362–63. James Howell's *Perfect Description of the People and Country of Scotland* (London, 1649) is, despite its title, full of predictable racist jokes and slurs.

<sup>100</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (March 11–18, 1652–53), p. 1470.

<sup>101</sup> “Report of Thomas Tucker upon the settlement of the revenues . . . 1656,” *Miscellany of the Scottish Borough Records Society* (Edinburgh, 1881), passim.

<sup>102</sup> Thus, there were at least nineteen different surveys of Ireland between 1653 and 1660 (C. Webster, *The Great Instauration* [London, 1975], p. 436).

<sup>103</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (July 23–29, 1656), pp. 5593–96; see also the advertisement for *A General History of the Island of Barbado's* (April 23–30, 1657), p. 7764.

<sup>104</sup> It was reported of Lambert in mid-1654 that “he knows them all now” (J. Y. Akerman, ed.), *Letters from Roundhead Officers* [Edinburgh, 1856], pp. 69, and 56, 59, 60–61 [hereafter, cited as *Letters from Roundhead Officers*].

<sup>105</sup> T. M. Devine, “The Cromwellian Union and the Scottish Burghs: The Case of Aberdeen and Glasgow, 1652–1660,” in *Scottish Themes*, ed. J. Butt and J. T. Ward (Edinburgh, 1976), pp. 7–8, 11. For a comment on prewar Scottish overland trade, see Henry Best's 1641 reference to “the poor Scottish merchants” trading with England, in Thirsk and Cooper, eds. (n. 29 above), p. 253. Cromwell did, however, receive a very precise assessment of potential coastal garrisons from someone who presumably

The only major exception to the journalistic silence on things Scottish came in a spate of reporting on Scottish law, occasioned by the descent on Scotland of the English commissioners for the administration of justice in 1652. This unusual press attention might, however, have hindered rather than helped the cause of understanding. The journals began by reporting more than a little hopefully that "There is little difference betwixt our Lawes, save only in the Terms and Forms; They imitate us English in most things."<sup>106</sup> But they continued by fixing—in tones whose air of studied superiority is unmistakable—only on the most salacious aspects of the Scottish taste for cases of buggery, bestiality, witchcraft, adultery, and murder, "the natural crimes of the Country . . . though by the Scots looked upon as venial sins," as one newspaper reported unctuously.<sup>107</sup> Such coverage, while provocative enough, was only temporary. Once the initial phase of upheaval, and attention, was over, newsbook discussion of Scotland—even more than of Ireland, where the dynastic interest could be gratified by accounts of the progresses of Henry Cromwell—settled into brief reports of the regime's ceremonial.<sup>108</sup> Those reports may have been intended to reassure, but scarcely to inform, an English audience.

Journalistic and epistolary conventions were obviously involved in such silences. As one correspondent from Edinburgh put it in 1655, "The peaceable and quiet condition of these parts, (doe most justly and willingly) put a frequent stop to my pen, which (otherwise) would be oftner employed, though to your trouble."<sup>109</sup> But such conventions cannot explain the general barrenness of the English presses.<sup>110</sup> That profit-hungry royalist wordsmith

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had traded extensively with Scotland (J. Nickolls, *Original Letters and Papers of State* [London, 1743], pp. 62–64: the letter is misattributed to Samuel Chidley).

<sup>106</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (June 10–17, 1652), p. 1664; as usual with news from Scotland, most newspapers carried the same report. To be fair to that English reporter, while modern scholars may question his judgment, the greatest of all Scottish legal scholars, Sir Thomas Craig, writing at the turn of the century, would have agreed with him (A. H. Williamson, *Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI* [Edinburgh, 1979], p. 8; see also W. David H. Sellar, "The Common Law of Scotland and the Common Law of England," in Davies, ed. [n. 19 above], pp. 82–99, esp. pp. 82, 94–95; and the remarks of W. Ferguson in his review of *The Formation of the British State*, by B. P. Levack, *Scottish Historical Review* 68 [1989]: 90).

<sup>107</sup> *Perfect Passages of Every daies Intelligence* (November 5–12, 1652), p. 567; see also *Severall Proceedings in Parliament* (October 28–November 4, 1652), pp. 2535–36; *A Perfect Diurnall* (November 1–8, 1652), p. 2266; *Mercurius Politicus* (June 26–July 3, 1656), pp. 7061–66.

<sup>108</sup> See, e.g., *Mercurius Politicus* (June 14–21, 1655), pp. 5416–18, (August 22–29, 1655), p. 5565, (May 1–8, 1656), pp. 6950–51.

<sup>109</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (March 29–April 5, 1655), p. 5229.

<sup>110</sup> The Scottish press at the time was largely monopolized by official declarations.

John Taylor the water poet brought out a list of Scottish kings in 1650.<sup>111</sup> But there seem to have been only two real works on Scottish history published in London in the 1650s, both written by Scots and both posthumous. One, Archbishop Spotswood's ecclesiastical history, was published not as a contribution to an understanding of the union but rather as an element in the Anglican polemic and memorializing of the 1650s.<sup>112</sup> The other, less partisan and a classic of humanist historiography, was by William Drummond of Hawthornden, and its way through the London presses was paid for by another Scot, Sir John Scot of Scotstarvet.<sup>113</sup> It was not that educated Englishmen were intellectually oblivious to Scotland. While his council contemplated the commissioning of a history of the army's conquest of Scotland, Cromwell himself treasured Drummond's work for what could be gained from it for the cause of religious toleration;<sup>114</sup> and Milton and others regularly mined the writings of James VI's tutor George Buchanan for arguments for resistance to kings. But there was little sign of any readiness to take Scotland on its own terms.<sup>115</sup> Perhaps the most telling evidence of English unconcern is the silence on Scotland—in contrast to the treatment of Ireland, whose helplessness invited speculation—in the overflowing correspondence of the Hartlib circle.<sup>116</sup> Apart from some patchy discussion of prospecting for precious

<sup>111</sup> J. Taylor, *The Number and Names of all the Kings of England and Scotland* (London, 1650).

<sup>112</sup> J. Spotswood, *History of the Church of Scotland* (London, 1655).

<sup>113</sup> William Drummond of Hawthornden, *History of Scotland* (London, 1655). Drummond's *Poems* were published in London the following year, thanks once again to the good offices of the Scottish "Maecaenas," Sir John Scot.

<sup>114</sup> Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth* (n. 50 above), pp. 75–76; Hartlib MSS, "Ephemerides, 1655" (Turnbull transcripts, p. 24), Sheffield University Library. Hartlib reported that Cromwell was much taken by "the speech spoken to King James V recorded in the History of Scotland by William Drummond of Hawthornden"; there is only one speech in the *History* to James V, and that (at pp. 210–14) is a speech put in the mouth of one of his councillors urging religious toleration.

<sup>115</sup> Milton's nephew Edward Phillips did, however, think Drummond of Hawthornden not only the finest Scottish poet, "a commendation not to be rejected," but as good as Tasso or "even the choicest of our English Poets" (William Drummond of Hawthornden, *Poems* [London, 1656], preface). More signally, appreciation could even be found, in Archbishop Usher's circle, for Gaelic Irish literary culture (Hartlib MSS, "Ephemerides, 1649" [Turnbull transcripts, p. 65], Sheffield University Library).

<sup>116</sup> Probably the most famous instance is the controversy over transplantation of Catholic Irish sparked by Vincent Gookin's measured pamphlet, *The Great Case of Transplantation Discussed* (London, 1655); but its intellectual high point is surely Gerald Boate's *Irelands Naturall History*, brought to the press in 1652 by Samuel Hartlib. The voluminous letters, drafts, and memoranda of Samuel Hartlib in Sheffield are full of schemes for particular and universal improvement, with many casting

metals,<sup>117</sup> the only sign of anyone looking north of Tweed is a 1649 approach to the town council of Edinburgh—on the recommendation of a weary English council of state!—by some Hartlibian projectors who had for three years been failing to interest the English Parliament in their proposals for improved herring fishing; to their distress, they were laughed out of the Edinburgh council chamber.<sup>118</sup>

The contrast between the English and the Scottish records of interest in a British identity is striking. One critic, castigating the Scots' constant "thirst after the power and privileges of this Commonwealth," warned that they had never loved Charles Stuart "as King of Scotland, but of Great Britain"; he exaggerated, but in singling out the long-standing Scottish interest in a wider polity he had a point to make.<sup>119</sup> Certainly the Scottish equivalents to the Englishmen who meant only "England" when they said "Great Britain" can be found.<sup>120</sup> But on the other hand, probably nowhere can there be found a commitment to a wider British culture equaling that of Scot of Scotstarvet, who not only funded the publication of Drummond's works in London but also, and more signally, organized and paid for the printing of Blaeu's elaborate British maps. Urging Scot's case for support to the Lord Protector, Colonel Lilburne revealed English priorities when he noted, "I finde the said mappes might be very useful to the army."<sup>121</sup> Almost as impressive is the record of Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromarty, one of the many European searchers after a universal language in the 1650s, who was taking his voluminous plans in the royal baggage train to have them printed in a conquered London when he had the misfortune to be plundered with the rest

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Ireland as the proving ground. Only a tiny portion of them got off the ground, even in Ireland (C. Webster, *The Great Instauration* [London, 1975], passim; and Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland* [n. 28 above], esp. pp. 213–48).

<sup>117</sup> See Webster (n. 102 above), pp. 395–96.

<sup>118</sup> Hartlib MSS, 12/190, 55/10, Sheffield University Library.

<sup>119</sup> *The False Brother* (n. 26 above), pp. 35, 55. For a similar verdict, see *Mercurius Politicus* (March 13–20, 1650–51), pp. 656, 663.

<sup>120</sup> See, e.g., Walter Forbes, *A Panegyricke to the High and Mighty Monarch Charles, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland, etc.* (Edinburgh, 1633).

<sup>121</sup> T. G. Snoddy, *Sir John Scot Lord Scotstarvet* (Edinburgh, 1968), pp. 23, 29. Had the money been available, the army's needs—whether for information or for esteem—in conjunction with the land transfers in Ireland and Scotland might in their turn have ushered in a new age of British cartography: some remarkably ambitious projects were being entertained in the mid-1650s—most notably, of course, Petty's Down survey—and it was presumably in a similar context that some English mapping of Scotland was under way at the end of the 1640s (Hartlib Papers, "Ephemerides, 1656" [Turnbull transcripts, pp. 6–7], "Ephemerides, 1652" [Turnbull transcripts, p. 17], "Ephemerides, 1655" [Turnbull transcripts, p. 107], Sheffield University Library).

of the king's army at Worcester. Undaunted, he urged the example of England's treatment of Wales, and the authority of Virgil's "divisos orbe Britannos," in a plea for a glorious union.<sup>122</sup> Indeed, even the arch-fanatic Johnston of Wariston may not have been quite as purblind as he is usually thought, for he can be found reading Speed's *Chronicles* as well as the more predictable English controversialists.<sup>123</sup> Similarly, the network of English correspondents maintained during the 1650s by Robert Baillie, and Baillie's own passionate interest in a wider world, hint—as did the agents retained by the Scottish boroughs in London—at a society that could adapt to its British position.<sup>124</sup>

The pattern of individual and small-scale contacts suggests a Scottish emotional or intellectual investment in Britain that does not square with the cynical interpretations usually put on the Scots' readiness to intervene in England in the 1640s and to proclaim Charles II king of Great Britain in 1649. Most early modern Englishmen assumed the sheer rapaciousness of the Scots; most modern English historians assume that the Scots aimed mainly at the protection of their Presbyterian church order. Materialism and fear for the Kirk obviously cannot be discounted.<sup>125</sup> Yet the language of some of the replies<sup>126</sup> to the Tender of Union in early 1652, language uttered in quite unpromising circumstances and by no means always forced by the English sword onto those who vented it, suggests that even if many shires and burghs found the manner of the proffered union abhorrent, the principle still held considerable attraction, just as it had for Argyll. The embattled nature of the Scottish Reformation had worked on a long-standing interest in themes British—a response to English feudal claims on Scotland—to give Scottish apocalyptic thought, especially as manifested in the writings of John Knox, a peculiarly British character. Myopic the Covenanters of the 1640s may have been in their dealings at Westminster; but they were also seeking to realize the

<sup>122</sup> Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromarty, *Discovery of a most exquisite Jewel* (London, 1652), pp. 2–5, 269–72.

<sup>123</sup> *Diary of Johnston of Wariston* (n. 8 above), 2:219, 229.

<sup>124</sup> *Letters of Baillie* (n. 20 above), 3:198, 224–26, 226–27, 231–32, 235–36, 265–66, 291–94, 302–7, 309–10, 325–26, 328–31, 332–34, 344–46, 366–67, 391; Nicoll (n. 59 above), p. 188; Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Protectorate* (n. 85 above), p. 222.

<sup>125</sup> The evidence for the latter is so voluminous that it needs no rehearsing; the former is suggested by the list of economic demands made of the union by the Scottish burghs and, in a rather different way, by the emergence of London in the 1650s as a marriage market for the Scottish aristocracy (Terry, ed. [n. 38 above], pp. xlv–lxvi, 54; *Letters of Baillie*, 3:366–67).

<sup>126</sup> Other of the replies were, it is true, more laconic, more formulaic, and sometimes more intransigent.

dreams of Knox.<sup>127</sup> True to that tradition, the deputies of Stirlingshire urged Parliament's commissioners to "procure a speidie and happie union, that may maik the Nation inseperable, and so insuperable." The "gentlemen and heretors" of Morayshire objected forcefully enough to the Tender; yet they professed themselves eager otherwise

to bee incorporated and made one with England, they being of all Nations dearest to us and cheife in our Affecciions and respect and with whom wee would Associate and take part against anie or all the Nations of the Earth . . . and being as it were naturally devidit from the rest of the world or in ane unseperable Contiguity so imbodyed together as one of us cannot bee well without the other. This is that Designe which our fathers aimed at, as foreseeing how much Confusion and blood might thereby bee avoidit and how much happines by the attainment thereof would accrue to the present and Generacions to Come.<sup>128</sup>

Just as some English millenarians could see in union a matter for exultation, so some Scots could see in it matter for hope despite the horror of conquest.

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Few of those hopes were borne out, it scarcely needs to be said. What closer ties with England meant in practice to Scotland and Ireland has been well surveyed by Lesley Smith and T. C. Barnard—the legal and institutional reforms petered out, and not even the Quakers had much energy to spare for evangelism elsewhere when there was so much to be done in England.<sup>129</sup> When a similar reckoning of the impact of union is attempted for England it yields a balance sheet scarcely more favorable. In no field, economic, ecclesiastical, or political, did union provide a clear record of the imposition of England's priorities and needs; nor did it bring England unmitigated gains.

The union was too short-lived for its economic effects to become clear; but the few visible signs were mixed. The economic recovery of the later 1650s brought the revival of Irish agricultural exports to England<sup>130</sup>—a revival that was to incur much animosity from English landowners and politicians in the

<sup>127</sup> See Mason, "Scotching the Brut" (n. 92 above), pp. 60–84; Williamson, *Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI* (n. 106 above), pp. 10–12, 41–42; Brown (n. 93 above), pp. 79–85; David Stevenson, "The Early Covenanters and the Federal Union of Britain," in Mason, ed., pp. 163–81. For the hereditary Argyll interest in British claims, see n. 19 above.

<sup>128</sup> Terry, ed., pp. 82, 112. To be fair, Colonel Birch insisted in Richard Cromwell's Parliament that the English borderlands took the same view of the union—as an essential preservative—as some of the Scots claimed to; John Hobart, however, denied this claim (*Diary of Thomas Burton* [n. 13 above], 4:117–18; "Mr Hubbard's speech in parliament 21 March 1658," at fol. 3, University of Illinois Library).

<sup>129</sup> L. M. Smith (n. 40 above); and Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland* (n. 28 above).

<sup>130</sup> Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp. 34–49.

1660s—and the advent of free trade with Scotland probably helped lower livestock prices somewhat as the path south for Scottish drovers was eased. But the limited contacts between Scottish and English merchant circles, the small tonnage of the shipping in Scottish harbors, and the fact that part of the Scottish distance trade was still channeled through a staple, at Veere in Zeeland, all suggest that Scotland's impact on England's economy was limited.<sup>131</sup> Scotland did not strike English observers as a land of opportunity, especially after the devastation caused by the recent wars. A handful of English tradesmen settled at Leith, the main supply port in the shadow of army headquarters, but Scottish borough regulations and the pessimism of serving army officers discouraged any inrush of English profit seekers. As the Receiver of the Scottish Exchequer reported gloomily late in 1655, "Here is no encouragement as yet for any to come hither for trading."<sup>132</sup> The direct repercussions of union were almost certainly localized, and limited to England's far north. There, controversy developed over the threat of Scottish salt, which thrived on lower wage rates, to the Tyneside salt pans, though tariffs did give some protection to its coal industry against the Scots.<sup>133</sup> Berwick-upon-Tweed, on the other hand—along with King's Lynn—boomed in the 1650s as a staging post and supply point for troops bound for Scotland.<sup>134</sup>

One indirect economic consequence of the closer integration of Britain was undoubtedly more significant than the petty gains in trade. Historical demographers have calculated that in the 1650s England experienced, proportionately, its highest rate of emigration until the later nineteenth century. The bulk of these unfortunates traveled not to the New World but to Ireland in search of subsistence on the lands and in the houses of that still more unfortunate group, the Catholic victims of the Republic's reconquest.<sup>135</sup> The churchwardens' and overseers' accounts of parishes in western England abound, especially in the bad years of the early 1650s, with records of petty doles paid to paupers of all sorts on their way to the Irish Sea ports.<sup>136</sup> In that

<sup>131</sup> Devine (n. 105 above), pp. 7–8, 11; "Report of Thomas Tucker upon the settlement of the revenues" (n. 101 above), passim; Mitchison (n. 72 above), p. 103.

<sup>132</sup> *Letters from Roundhead Officers* (n. 104 above), pp. 122–23; Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Protectorate* (n. 85 above), pp. 239–40, 248–49; *Diary of Thomas Burton*, 1:12–16.

<sup>133</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1657–1658*, PRO, pp. 286, 317–18; Firth, ed., *Clarke Papers* (n. 17 above), 3:81.

<sup>134</sup> J. Scott, *Berwick-upon-Tweed* (London, 1888), pp. 211–14; H. J. Hillen, *History of King's Lynn*, 2 vols. (Norwich, 1907), 1:380.

<sup>135</sup> E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541–1871* (London, 1981), pp. 219–21, 224.

<sup>136</sup> This conclusion is based on a reading of surviving parish accounts for the 1650s from a large number of counties.

sense Ireland played a valuable role as a safety valve—less politically, for any danger of popular insurrection was by then over, than economically, in allowing England to recover from the terrible hardships of the later 1640s.

If Ireland's suffering contributed to England's unsteady progress in the later seventeenth century toward economic growth, so the peripheries played an unwitting and an unwilling part in the growth of a colonial empire too. Until the full development of the African slave trade, the colonies from Virginia southward into the Caribbean remained perennially short of labor. In the early seventeenth century various ad hoc and unsystematic addresses to the problem had been made. To meet the needs of the Virginia Company, physical coercion was sometimes added to the economic constraint of indentured servitude, as City magistrates sought to off-load helpless paupers, with the occasional blessing of the privy council. The policing element in such a response to labor shortage became more apparent as it briefly enveloped English felons and Irish troublemakers around 1620.<sup>137</sup> The sudden and dramatic increase in the numbers of prisoners under English control at the end of the 1640s—at a time when turncoats willing to enlist in parliamentary regiments were no longer needed—dramatically changed the dimensions of policy. English and Welsh prisoners from the 1648 fighting transported “beyond the Seas . . . to America, Venice, or as they shall be appointed,” were early victims of what became the regularized practice of penal transportation.<sup>138</sup>

The extension of transportation to Scotland and Ireland affected both the numbers and the quality of the victims. The losers in war in Ireland and Scotland had long paid the penalty for their mistakes, for their religion, or for their clan name by emigration; the “flight of the earls” from Ulster in 1607 is only the most famous episode in a history that had provided mercenary regiments for most of the belligerents in Europe. The victor of course watched

<sup>137</sup> Corporation of London Record Office, Precedent Book 2, fol. 57v; D. W. Galenson, *White Servitude in Colonial America* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 3–15; *Analecta Hibernica* 4 (1932): 159; I am grateful to James Robertson for the first citation and for pointing me toward the two latter sources. See also A. E. Smith, “Transportation of Convicts to American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century,” *American Historical Review* 39 (1934): 232–37. For some further instances, see M. S. Gretton, *Oxfordshire JPs in the Seventeenth Century* (Oxfordshire, 1934), pp. xci–xciii; the governors of London's Bridewell in fact maintained the links with colonial merchants forged in James's reign through the Civil War (E. G. O'Donoghue, *Bridewell Revisited* [London, 1929], pp. 12, 18, 21, 90).

<sup>138</sup> John Rushworth, *Historical Collections*, 8 vols. (London, 1659–80), 7:1145, 1250; H. M. Vaughan, “Oliver Cromwell in South Wales, 1648–1649,” *Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion* (1936), pp. 57–58. Welshmen suffered again in 1651: J. E. Auden, “Shropshire and the Royalist Conspiracies,” *Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History Society*, 3d ser., 10 (1910): 108 and n.

happily as potential troublemakers were removed to fight and die abroad. Accordingly, capitulation agreements during the wars of conquest and reconquest from 1649 to 1654 often contain clauses permitting the vanquished to take his men into the service of a foreign power, provided that power was not hostile to the Commonwealth.<sup>139</sup> But complications arose. At least until 1652 or 1653 there were few powers which were not hostile to the Commonwealth; furthermore, after Dunbar in particular the sheer number of prisoners, and the impossibility of returning them to a still-belligerent Scotland, precluded an orderly recruiting effort. Despite Cromwell's denial that he intended "to make merchandize of men, or to get a gain to our selves,"<sup>140</sup> the Rump was driven to seek a way out of its embarrassment by allowing the northern potentate Sir Arthur Hesilrig to draft captives from Dunbar into the Tyneside coal mines; Cromwell's concern for the Protestant interest in Ireland secured some of these Presbyterian stalwarts for foot service in Ireland, but very soon private enterprise had to be co-opted and the Rump's friends among the City merchants were shipping them off to New England.<sup>141</sup> Another flood of prisoners in the following year from Worcester set the Council of State looking again, if only briefly, to the New World.<sup>142</sup> The progressive collapse of resistance in Ireland, coupled with the danger of renewed instability during the transplantation of Catholics into its western provinces, gave a new urgency to this solution, and in April 1652 Parliament referred to the Council of State the matter of transportation of Irish prisoners abroad. Soon, transportation to the plantations of Barbados was in full swing.<sup>143</sup> Within a year the council, on the familiar assumption that idleness was the raw material of political dissidence, had extended the penalty of

<sup>139</sup> For example, Terry, ed. (n. 38 above), pp. 276, 283; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1651*, PRO, p. 245.

<sup>140</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (September 26–October 3, 1650), p. 285: Cromwell was here denying any intention to sell captives for ransom. He had shown no qualms about putting Irish prisoners to—as he would have seen it—productive use in Barbados after Drogheda (*Writings and Speeches* [n. 12 above], 2:124, 204).

<sup>141</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1650*, PRO, pp. 333, 334, 340, 358, 375, 397, 402, 419, 438. Doubtless remembering the fate of Welsh captives in 1648, Marchamont Nedham had predicted this outcome even before the English army crossed the Scottish border (*Mercurius Politicus* [June 27–July 4, 1650], p. 58). The Scots were not uniquely ill-treated as prisoners by being forced to work for their keep: prisoners taken in the Dutch war were set to help drain the Fens.

<sup>142</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1651–1652*, PRO, pp. 20, 44, 67, 120, 164, 267, 313, 500; and (for Welsh prisoners) *Mercurius Politicus* (June 19–26, 1651), p. 885. Many Scottish prisoners died in captivity; the rest were probably sent home, or to Ireland, as resistance in Scotland collapsed. See also Westlake (n. 42 above), p. 109.

<sup>143</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (April 15–22, 1652), p. 1550; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1651–1652*, PRO, p. 432. For Cromwell's disposition of the Drogheda prisoners, see n. 140 above.

transportation from those taken in arms to the idle poor in conquered areas; in the view of the Venetian resident, England was thus approaching a solution to the problems of Catholicism in Ireland and of labor supply in the colonies.<sup>144</sup> The outbreak and then the quelling of Glencairn's revolt in 1652–54 occasioned the extension to Scotland of a method of pacification whose appeal was as much social as political. The singling out there of “idle rogues” as well as belligerent clansmen underlines the connection between methods of control in the conquered territories and those that were in 1655–56 to be applied against potential troublemakers in England during the rule of the major generals.<sup>145</sup> The systematic transportation to the colonies of reprieveable English convicts began with a warrant to the magistrates of Surrey in August 1655.<sup>146</sup> The need to deal with the subjugated peripheries, first by disposing of the surplus of prisoners and then by forcibly pacifying discontented and impoverished regions, had thus set a pattern for the use of human resources throughout Britain for an overseas empire.

But such an imperial posture could not be without its costs. However much the acquisition of empire affirmed providentialists' sense of divine mandate, it may conversely have helped sap the self-confidence of a regime whose ideological origins could be traced back to the Self-denying Ordinance of 1645. Misgivings naturally centered on Ireland: there was little for the fortune hunter in Scotland apart from opportunities for advance up the army's career ladder<sup>147</sup> and petty shakedowns and poaching for the common soldiers.<sup>148</sup> But Ireland offered opportunities aplenty to the covetous. It was no accident that

<sup>144</sup> J. W. Blake, “Transportation from Ireland to America, 1653–1660,” *Irish Historical Studies* 3 (1942–43): 269; *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, 1653–1654*, PRO, p. 119.

<sup>145</sup> *Mercurius Politicus* (February 23–March 2, 1653–54), p. 3302, and (April 13–20, 1654), p. 3428; Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Protectorate* (n. 85 above), pp. 64, 65; *Letters from Roundhead Officers* (n. 104 above), p. 88; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1655–1656*, PRO, p. 103. Many of those taken in Penruddock's Rebellion in the southwest in the spring of 1655 had been transported; furthermore, some of the English taken at Worcester in 1651 had been sold to Barbados (E. A. B. Barnard, “Some Beoley Parish Accounts, 1656–1700,” *Transactions of the Worcestershire Archaeological Society* 25 [1948]: 19).

<sup>146</sup> A. E. Smith (n. 137 above), p. 237.

<sup>147</sup> *Letters from Roundhead Officers* is full of discussions of the pros and cons of a Scottish posting, in which the chance of action and recognition had to be set against the tendency of administrators in London to forget all who were at a distance from their door.

<sup>148</sup> Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth* (n. 50 above), pp. 141–42, 154–55; R. W. Ketton-Cremer, *Norfolk in the Civil War* (London, 1969), p. 268. The minister of Inverness, however, felt differently. Writing of the dismantling of the garrison in 1662, he observed, “Never people left a place with such reluctance. It was even sad to see and heare sighes and teares, pale faces and embraces, at their parting farewell from that

Colonel Fenwick, commanding in Edinburgh, dreamed of sending Johnston of Wariston, perhaps the greatest single obstacle to the smooth exercise of his command, to Ireland; there, Fenwick told him, he “might maik a fortune.”<sup>149</sup> Lord Deputy Fleetwood would have been appalled, for he urged Secretary Thurloe in 1654 that only such officers be sent to Ireland who were “fearing God, able, and hateing covetousnes the great temptation of Ireland which most that comes if not impowred with a very selfe denying spirit wil fall into.” Indeed, the English officers in Ireland saw settlement as in all likelihood a moral disaster, and petitioned for the total displacement of all Catholics, not so much to avoid religious contamination or physical danger but rather to save the English from themselves, by removing “those temptations . . . as in reference to gifts, rewards, and other advantages; as also in usurping and exercising of Dominion over them in waies of oppression.”<sup>150</sup> Empire, with all its trappings, could prove unsettling to the truly godly,<sup>151</sup> as one admiralty official affirmed when he denounced “the vaine pomp” of the stately funeral of Henry Ireton, lord deputy of Ireland, finding it “very offensive to many a gracious soule that desired to walke slowly with the Lord.”<sup>152</sup>

The conquered lands exacted toll from England in ways that were central to the self-definition of the republic. Self-denial was one element in the ethic of godly republicanism; the other was of course moral discipline and reformation. And here the impact of the periphery on the center is clear, if unexpected. The high point in England’s moral campaign is often taken to be the 1650 act against fornication and adultery, an act which is usually described as in part a response to Ranter excesses and in part the culmination of a century or more of moralist impulse.<sup>153</sup> But in Scotland in 1649 the search for a cause of that divine displeasure that had brought political and military disaster combined

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town. . . . They made that place happy, and it made them so” (quoted in W. Ferguson, *Scotland’s Relations with England: A Survey to 1707* [Edinburgh, 1977], p. 140).

<sup>149</sup> Given the material complications of the rest of his career, Johnston’s fear of being “removed out of Scotland” at this time probably related as much to his fear of yielding to such temptation as to anything else (*Diary of Johnston of Wariston* [n. 8 above], p. 262).

<sup>150</sup> British Library, Add. MSS 4156, fol. 71v; *Mercurius Politicus* (March 29–April 5, 1655), pp. 5236–38. See also Col. Robert Bennet’s warning to Sir Hardress Waller, newly returned to Ireland in 1650, of the dangers of prosperity: MS. X.d.483, 50, Folger Library, Washington, D.C.

<sup>151</sup> Especially when imperialism failed, as it did in the Western Design (see B. Worden, “Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan,” in *History, Society and the Churches*, ed. D. Beales and G. Best [Cambridge, 1985], pp. 125–45; and Armitage [n. 64 above], pp. 540–46).

<sup>152</sup> Quoted in M. J. Seymour, “Pro-Government Propaganda in the English Republic, 1649–1660” (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1986), pp. 222–23.

<sup>153</sup> K. Thomas, “The Adultery Act of 1650 Reconsidered,” in *Puritans and Revolutionaries*, ed. K. Thomas and D. Pennington (Oxford, 1978), pp. 257–82.

with the growing fears of sectarian contamination from England to produce a remarkable series of moralist statutes, even fiercer than England's adultery act.<sup>154</sup> The possibility that the latter was to some extent a reply to the former is suggested by the fact that some in the two nations were quite literally playing holier-than-thou.<sup>155</sup> When the doomed Scottish parliament in 1650 enacted that for the "doun bearing of sin and filthines" no woman should sell ale or wine in Edinburgh, the Leith garrison soon responded with a similar order for its confines; and English military punishments on dissolute soldiers were, as Scots approvingly noted, harsher than the already harsh punishments of the Kirk.<sup>156</sup> But the clearest evidence that one party looked at the other through its moral program is provided by the English commissioners for the administration of justice in Scotland. At their first session one of their number "made an elegant speech concerning the occasion of their meeting and to take off some aspersions which were laid uppon the parliament by the Ministers of Scotland as to the tolerating and countenancing of Heresies and Blasphemies whereas the parliament of England had by severall Acts declared against all Evills of that Nature and more particularly against swearing, breaking the sabboth and the like and gave direccions for reading the Act against Heresies etc."<sup>157</sup>

In its constitutional form as well as its dominant ethic the Cromwellian regime was, paradoxically, shaped by its British subjects. The confusion over the revision of the protectoral constitution in the Humble Petition and Advice occasioned an interminable and acrimonious debate in Richard Cromwell's Parliament over the sitting of the members for Scotland and Ireland. Time and again English members observed that since the quorum for business in the Commons was forty, the combined group of sixty members from the peripheries could—given the prevailing but of course unacknowledged absenteeism—sway the House. For as members pointed out as frequently, the Humble Petition had itself been passed by only three votes in a House whose Scottish and Irish members were overwhelmingly governmental loyalists. To the commonwealthsmen who so opposed the protectorate, the very constitution had in a sense been imposed by the peripheries on the center.<sup>158</sup> As John Hobart graphically put it, "They have fully morallised that Fable of the Pigg

<sup>154</sup> *Acts done and past . . .* (n. 19 above), Acts 2, 11, 12, 18–20, 22–24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33.

<sup>155</sup> For some earlier examples of legislators in one country influencing those in the other, see Sellar (n. 106 above), pp. 92–93.

<sup>156</sup> Nicoll (n. 59 above), pp. 5–6, 67, 69, 79; L. M. Smith (n. 40 above), p. 42.

<sup>157</sup> Clarke MSS, vol. 22, fol. 92, Worcester College, Oxford.

<sup>158</sup> *Diary of Thomas Burton* (n. 13 above), 4:87–242, *passim*.

that having by squeaking first got in his nose, not onely soone got in his wholl body, but crowded away the Children from the fyre.”<sup>159</sup>

But it was in the dynamics of politics that the making of Britain had the clearest impact on England. More than perhaps anything else, the union underlines the fundamental dilemma of the republic. Facing Stuart challenges in both Ireland and Scotland, the Rump in 1649–52 determined to subjugate or destroy its enemies; but, as Marvell so presciently warned, the sword once drawn must remain erect.<sup>160</sup> In December 1654, 42,000 out of the Commonwealth’s total establishment of over 53,000 troops were serving outside England and Wales.<sup>161</sup> Force, so necessary for survival, itself undermined the regime, for the armies cost money: even though both Ireland and Scotland were taxed at, proportionately, considerably higher rates than was England,<sup>162</sup> the regimes there never broke even.<sup>163</sup> Maurice Ashley estimated that “the net cost of the union [with Scotland] to England was at least £130,000 a year,” a figure that represents, roughly, 10–20 percent of the varying level of the monthly assessment on England during the protectorate.<sup>164</sup> The impact of Ireland on the government’s budget was similar. Clarendon regarded Ireland as “the great capital out of which all debts were paid,” and it is true that in the short term the availability of Irish lands to satisfy the arrears of unpaid troops helped stabilize the republic.<sup>165</sup> Yet in the longer term the verdict must be very different, since the Dublin administration ran constantly at a sizable deficit.<sup>166</sup> Taxation in England therefore remained at politically unacceptable levels, which in turn required a larger military establishment within England. The anger shown in the assessment debates in Parliament in 1657 suggests members’ consciousness of the imbalance; more farsighted observers recog-

<sup>159</sup> “Mr Hubbard’s Speech in Parliament 21 March 1658,” at fol. 2v, University of Illinois Library.

<sup>160</sup> Margoliouth (n. 21 above), p. 90.

<sup>161</sup> H. M. Reece, “The Military Presence in England, 1649–1660” (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1981), p. 287.

<sup>162</sup> Monck estimated in 1657 that Scotland paid one-quarter of England’s assessment on only one-sixteenth of its wealth, while the high level of the Irish assessment, at around one-eighth of England’s, remained a perennial concern of Irish administrators throughout the decade (L. M. Smith, p. 90; Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland* [n. 28 above], pp. 28–30; *Calendar of State Papers, Irish, 1647–1660*, PRO, p. 660). Monck’s figures for the Scottish assessment were only a slight exaggeration.

<sup>163</sup> Thus, the 1659 Scottish assessment covered only one-quarter of the cost of the army in Scotland (Dow [n. 28 above], p. 216).

<sup>164</sup> M. P. Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, 2d ed. (London, 1962), p. 91.

<sup>165</sup> Edward, Earl of Clarendon, *Life*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1888), 2:218.

<sup>166</sup> Estimated in 1658 at £96,000 (Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, pp. 26–27).

nized as well the hidden economic costs of the diversion of so many resources to the task of holding down hostile populations.<sup>167</sup> The Republic's failure to normalize its position in the core state, to gain a greater measure of acceptance, thus owed much to the fiscal consequences of its projection of its might. The misgivings of all those who had in 1650 warned against the conquest of Scotland were borne out. When the largest part of a hugely expensive army was committed to sustaining that rule beyond England's borders, it can be argued that the British problem brought down the republic almost as surely as it did the early Stuart monarchy.

Successive attempts to deal with the British problem during the revolutionary years had a longer-term significance. Not only did the costs of too close a relationship provide an object lesson for the future; the group identifications that the episode inspired—not only among the Scots and the Irish<sup>168</sup> but among the English too—shaped future choices. While republicans, whether classical or providentialist, might have found England's British rule consoling, the number of Englishmen who had anything positive to say for their British neighbors had been vastly reduced. Yet there was a symmetry in the final outcome. If the Scots and the Irish gained little beyond bloodshed and fiscal exactions, much the same can be said of the English.

<sup>167</sup> *Diary of Thomas Burton* (n. 13 above), 2:200, 208–12, 224, 246; Thirsk and Cooper, eds. (n. 29 above), pp. 58–59.

<sup>168</sup> See J. H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present*, no. 137 (1992), p. 64.