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Author(s): Dieter Langewiesche

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Dieter Langewiesche

Monarchy – Global. Monarchical Self-Assertion in a Republican World*

In 1793, the republic was presented to the world as the mortal enemy of the monarchy with the beheading of the French royal couple in Paris; today, the British queen presides over a union of 53 states, the majority of which are republics. The republicanisation of the Commonwealth under the crowned head began with the accession of India in 1949. Monarchy and republic had reconciled as forms of the state.¹ Just two decades earlier, it was still a different story. For the losing side, the First World War culminated in the downfall of its monarchies. The republic was part of the victors' dictate of democracy, although, Great Britain, *the* world monarchy, was among the victors, and monarchies also featured among the successor states of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

The republicanisation of monarchical states as a condition of peace was a revocation of nineteenth-century Europe.² The latter had learnt to enable two mutually exclusive state forms to attain mutual acceptance through a conflictual process. Whether or not the head of state wore a crown no longer decided on the alliances. However, the revocation was not permanent. In addition, if senior British officials had had their way, the revocation would never have happened. Douglas Haig, the

* I would like to thank Andreas Eckert and Friedrich Lenger, as well as the participants of the symposiums in Berlin (Stefan Rinke, Sebastian Conrad), Bern (Stefan Rebenich, Christian Windler), Konstanz (Jürgen Osterhammel) and Passau (Benjamin Hasselhorn, Marc von Knorring) for the discussions on this text.

1 The London Declaration of 1949 declared the British Queen as the «symbol of the free association of its independent members and as such the Head of the Commonwealth». This formulation enabled the inclusion of India in the Commonwealth despite the fact that it had declared itself a republic. Today, the majority of the Commonwealth states are republics (32). 5 of the Commonwealth's 21 monarchies have indigenous dynasties. Essential reading on

this topic: P. Murphy, *Monarchy and the End of Empire. The House of Windsor, the British Government, and the Post-War Commonwealth*, Oxford 2013.

2 For more detail on this point, see D. Langewiesche, «Monarchie und Republik im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts», in: U. Daniel / C. K. Frey (eds.), *Die preußisch-welfische Hochzeit 1913: Das dynastische Europa in seinem letzten Friedensjahrzehnt*, Braunschweig 2016, 16–25. From a different perspective, the peace agreements of 1919 represented the destruction of the «firewall» that the Peace of Westphalia had erected between international and inner-state politics, of which the state form was also a part. A. Tooze, *The Deluge. The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order*, London 2014, 8.

British commander-in-chief on the Western Front, would have preferred to leave the Hohenzollern monarchy intact so as not to destabilise Europe's system of states.³ Like Winston Churchill, who, with a view on saving the peace, unsuccessfully sought to win the prime minister's support to hold a conference of European monarchies in 1914.⁴ In 1921, as Colonial Secretary at the Cairo Conference, Churchill contributed to the establishment of two new kingdoms under British patronage in the mandate territories of Transjordan and Mesopotamia. The Protectorate in Egypt was also transformed into a kingdom in Egypt in 1922. It was demonstrated once again here that «the language of monarchy» and «the paternalistic ideology of British colonialism» were tailored to each other.⁵ Churchill saw the destruction of the monarchies in Germany and Austria under the influence of President Wilson as one of the worst mistakes of the Paris Peace Conference. As late as 1934, Churchill was still hoping for a «swing back to monarchies» on the European continent. At the time, he spoke of the global «holocaust of crowns» he had experienced in his lifetime: the losses in Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, Greece, Spain and the end of all of the German monarchies.⁶

The developments after the two world wars had fully convinced Churchill that «any king is better than no king».⁷ He expressed this view in even more ebullient terms when Elizabeth II was crowned: «No institution pays such dividends as the monarchy.»⁸ However, what dividends were yielded, and for whom? What did the global presence of the European states mean for the monarchy as an institution in Europe, in the imperial territories and in the context of decolonisation? The question as to the legitimacy assigned to and claimed by the institution of the monarchy can be adopted as an analytical guide to explaining this. The focus is on the British Empire as the most geographically extensive, most politically and culturally powerful one. My thesis is that the European monarchy can only be adequately captured as an institution through the perspective of its global connections. While this goes without saying for the golden age of the Portuguese and Spanish Empires, it does not apply to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. References have even been made to a «global trend towards the downfall of monarchy» that was mainly «counteracted

3 R. Blake (ed.), *The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914–1919. Being Selections from the Private Diary and Correspondence of Field-Marshal the Earl Haig of Bemersyde, K.T., C. C. B., O.M., etc.*, London 1952, 252. (28.8.1917).

4 D. Cannadine, «Thrones: Churchill and Monarchy in Britain and Beyond», in: idem, *In Churchill's Shadow. Confronting the Past in Modern Britain*, London 2002, 45–84, 58.

5 J. Whidden, *Monarchy and Modernity in Egypt: Politics, Islam, and Neo-Colonialism between the Wars*, New York 2013, 188. The British government was also later involved in the regulation of succession in

Egypt. Cf. M. T. Thornhill, «Informal Empire, Independent Egypt and the Accession of King Farouk», in: *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (JICH) 38 (2010) 2, 279–302.

6 W. S. Churchill, «Will the World Swing Back to Monarchies? (Pearson's Magazine, January 1934)», in: *The Collected Essays of Sir Winston Churchill*, vol. 4, London 1976, 268–272, 269.

7 Quoted after Cannadine, «Churchill and Monarchy», 72.

8 Winston Churchill, *The Struggle for Survival 1940–1965. Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran*, London 1966, 372–373.

through political symbolism».⁹ I argue differently in this study: What is involved here is a process of institutional self-assertion through transformation.

As a starting point, it should be noted that 44 of the 193 United Nations member states are still monarchies today. Most of these (21) belong to the British Commonwealth. Great Britain was already the main pillar of the institution of monarchy during the colonial period. 28 of today's 44 monarchies emerged from the British colonial empire and only two from its French counterpart (Cambodia and Morocco). Of the 44 states with monarchs as their heads, 13 are located in Asia, 12 in Europe (including The Vatican), 9 in Central America, 6 in Australia and Oceania, 3 in Africa, and 1 (Canada) in North America.

1. On the Legitimacy of Monarchy and Republic — Europe.

Max Weber distinguished three ideal types of legitimate authority from one another based on the following: (1) rational grounds and being indebted to «a belief in the legality of enacted rules», from which the right to rule is derived; (2) traditional grounds «resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions», and the authority that is derived from them; (3) charismatic grounds that rely on the «devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person» and the «normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him».¹⁰ The modern form of the republic, for which its legitimacy is rooted in the sovereignty of the people, tends to follow the rational rule, however charismatic elements can also feature, particularly in times of crisis that completely overwhelm the legality of enacted rules. This was the case with the National Socialist «Führer state».¹¹ Charismatic elements can be observed in numerous US presidents, caudillos in nineteenth-century Latin America, as well as the Italian republican Giuseppe Garibaldi. Garibaldi learnt the art of warfare while operating in the service of the Republic of Uruguay against territorial attacks by the dictator in the neighbouring Republic of Argentina. He was subsequently involved in the destruction of several thrones in Italy, through which he paved the way to the formation of the monarchical nation state there. As a «hero of two worlds», the Latin-American-republican and the European-monarchical ones, Garibaldi contributed unintentionally to the reconciliation of the monarchy and the republic.¹² Due to Garibaldi's failure as a republican, the cha-

9 J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, München 2009, 838.

10 Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe I, 23, Tübingen 2013, 453; the English translation is M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by G. Roth / C. Wittich, Berkeley/LA 1958, 215.

11 For an essential contribution, see M. R. Lepsius, «Das Modell der charismatischen Herrschaft und seine Anwendbarkeit auf den «Führerstaat» Adolf Hitlers (1986)», in: idem, *Demokratie in Deutsch-*

land. Soziologisch-historische Konstellationsanalysen, Göttingen 1993, 95–118.

12 L. Riall, *Garibaldi. Invention of a Hero*, New Haven 2007; A. Scirocco, *Garibaldi. Citizen of the World*, Princeton 2007. On Caudillo as a replacement monarch in the republic, see R. Graham, *Independence in Latin America*, New York 1972, 125–131; on his role in the limitation of violence, see M. Zeuske, *Simón Bolívar. Befreier Südamerikas. Geschichte und Mythos*, Berlin 2011, 64–66.

risma he acquired in the national war of unification did not have to be proven in his daily routine. It suited his contemporaries to transform him into a hero of national foundation, to whom different political orientations could later refer to present their objectives as nationally unfulfilled.

The monarchy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was able to partake in all three types of authority. The traditional legitimacy forms the basis as is embodied in the dynastic inherited charisma. However, the success of the constitutional state, the increase in the power of parliaments, the democratisation and secularisation processes, which ran contrary to the inherited claims of divine grace, demanded enormous flexibility from monarchies in Europe until the First World War. The monarchy as an institution survived this challenge.¹³ Europe remained a continent of monarchies with just a few republican particles, and whether France would eventually be one of them appeared to be an open question for a long time. All new states, without exception, received a crowned head.

Although the institution of the monarchy was successful, the form that it would take in the future in Europe remained undecided until 1914. The spectrum ranged from the parliamentary monarchy in Great Britain and other states (namely Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states) to the autocratic state in Russia, with a variety of intermediate forms in between, for example in Germany (with its regional monarchies) and in Austria-Hungary. Changes were made everywhere that aimed to impose stronger limits on the monarchical rule than before; however, it remained unclear until 1914 exactly how far this trend would develop in the individual states. The decision was made during and through the war. It emerged once again that monarchs could be made to pay with their thrones for their defeats in wars. Thanks to parliamentarisation, which meant a loss of monarchical power and a simultaneous exoneration from responsibility for government policy, it is impossible to know whether or not the British monarchy would have survived a defeat in the war. Its commander-in-chief on the Western Front firmly believed that it would not have survived: «If the war had gone against us, no doubt our King would have had to go, and probably our Army would have become insubordinate like the German Army.»¹⁴

After the First World War, the profile of both forms of the state – as they had developed in the nineteenth century – became more disparate in Europe. Democratic self-assertion was to be found on both sides, as well as the path to dictatorship. Since the transatlantic republican shock of the late eighteenth century, the European monarchy as an institution had legitimised all forms of authority between democracy and dictatorship, and it had also proved itself to be extraordinarily adaptable in relation to social policy. The full extent of the willingness to annihilate, which was associated

13 H. Gollwitzer, *Weltpolitik und deutsche Geschichte. Gesammelte Studien*, edited by H.-C. Kraus, München 2008, remains an extremely stimulating read.

For a more recent take, see Langewiesche, *Die Monarchie im Jahrhundert Europas.*, Heidelberg 2013.

14 *Private Papers of Douglas Haig*, 341.

with the new type of *Weltanschauung* dictatorships that emerged in the twentieth century, was only visible in the states in which the monarchies had been destroyed, namely Russia and Germany. With the murder of the royal family, the new Russia broke away from the old, and since then the strict anti-monarchy stance of the Soviet Union never changed. As opposed to this, the monarchical circles and the house of Hohenzollern up to Wilhelm II and his second wife pinned their hopes for the restoration of the monarchy in Germany on National Socialism. However, this «mésalliance between the house of Hohenzollern and the NS movement» failed before the National Socialists came to power.¹⁵ Hence, the radical break with the past as forced by Stalinism and National Socialism with their variously based policy of annihilation is not connected to the institution of the monarchy. However, to qualify, it must also be noted that these regimes did not offer it any possibility for participation either. As demonstrated by the attempts to survive as royal dictatorships or «monarcho-fascism», the monarchy proved that it understood how to fit in with fascist regimes in south and southeast Europe.¹⁶

2. Monarchical Legitimacy — Global

In his 1934 article titled «Will the World Swing Back to Monarchies?», Churchill responded to the omnipresent «chorus for the strong man» with a reference to the wisdom of the «English conception of a limited monarchy». He identified the core of the latter as lying in «the separation of pomp from power».¹⁷ As much as he valued the magic of the crown as a symbol of political freedom and social integration, he remained consistently resolute in his support of a «minimalist doctrine of kingly power», as David Cannadine described it.¹⁸ However, as an imperial institution, in terms of power politics, the monarchy did not present itself minimalistically in any way until well into the twentieth century. Its trademark was far more one of pomp and power.

Cannadine's concept of «ornamentalism» aims to focus the attention on the British Empire as a cultural creation – an «imaginatively constructed artefact».¹⁹ However, it was also always the geopolitical power structure that the pomp did not conceal in any way; instead the pomp made it possible to experience this power structure on a visual level. Cultural enactment as the attempt by the metropole to export its own

15 S. Malinowski, *Vom König zum Führer. Deutscher Adel und Nationalsozialismus*, 2nd edition, Frankfurt/ M. 2004, 509.

16 H. Sundhaussen, «Die Königsdiktaturen in Südosteuropa. Umriss einer Synthese», in: E. Oberländer et al. (eds.), *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1919–1944*, Paderborn 2001, 337–348 (this volume provides overviews of all the southeast European states); P. Miquel, *Les derniers rois de l'Europe*, Paris 1992. Miquel relates monarcho-fascism to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. A polemical

concept, monarcho-fascism is contemporary and was mainly deployed as a battle cry by communists; W. Loth / W. Wippermann (eds.), «*Faschismus*» – *kontrovers*, Stuttgart 2002, 23. W. Schieder, *Der italienische Faschismus 1919–1945*, München 2010, refers to «*monarchischen Faschismus*» (95).

17 Churchill, *Collected Essays*, 4, 270.

18 Cannadine, «*Thrones*», 50.

19 D. Cannadine, *Ornamentalism. How the British Saw their Empire*, Oxford 2001, 3.

20 R. Robinson, «Imperial Theory and the Question of

order of values through a variety of communication routes and to shape the empire on the basis of this image was one of the types of action of *indirect rule*. However, this «empire on the cheap»²⁰ did not rely on the constitutionally tamed monarch who had been stripped of power by parliamentary means. The remote, absent British monarch was present in the pomp of the empire as a powerful ruler. When Empire Day was introduced in 1904, a senior British official in the Bengali administration decreed that, as the baseline for all associated acts, everything should be focused on the person of the «King-Emperor as the centre of the British Empire».²¹ Indirect rule had functioned in extremely different ways across the broad expanse of the empire and over the course of time, but it had to remain clear at all times where the power lay²²: The power was identified with the crown. To put it bluntly, the monarchy was stripped of power in the European centre earlier than in the global peripheries. It took considerably longer to constitutionalise the representatives of the British monarch in the empire than to «parliamentarise» the monarchy in the imperial metropole.²³

As long as the hierarchical order of the empire withstood decolonisation, the British monarchy remained one of its most important pillars of legitimacy and, here too, it proved itself once again to be an institution with an enormous capacity for adaptation. It legitimised this process by adapting itself in the conversion of the Empire into a republican-monarchical Commonwealth. As the head of the Commonwealth, the monarch was even able to act discreetly both for and against the British government. When Prime Minister Macmillan spoke of the «wind of change» in his sensational address to the South African parliament in 1960, for which Macmillan deserves recognition whether one likes him or not, Elizabeth II made her agreement known – an unusual act of political intervention in the business of government.²⁴ It was also known that Elizabeth did not agree with the refusal of the Thatcher government to support the Commonwealth sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa. When she discovered that Nelson Mandela with a delegation of the African National Congress was in Harare in 1991, she invited Mandela to the banquet she was hosting for the heads of government. Mandela, who originated from a collateral line of a royal family, was seated close to her table at the banquet.²⁵

The British crown had long relinquished its imperial status by this time. Elizabeth was no longer the queen of a global empire but of individual Commonwealth

Imperialism after Empire», in: *JICH* 22 (1984) 2, 42–54, 48. Cf. «colonialism-on-the-cheap» by M. Kilson, *Political Change in a West African State. A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge/MA. 1966, 24. For a stimulating approach to this question, see A. G. Hopkins, «Rethinking Decolonization», in: *Past and Present* 200 (2008), 211–247.

21 T. R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, Cambridge 1998, 221.

22 R. Jeffrey, «The Politics of Indirect Rule: Types of

Relationship among Rulers, Ministers and Residents in a «Native State»», in: *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 13 (1975), 261–281, 266.

23 V. Bogdanor, *The Monarchy and the Constitution*, Oxford 1995, sees the modern parliamentary monarchy as being realised with the end of the Victorian era. Prince Albert is reported to have wanted a «presidential monarchy» (37).

24 *Ibid.*, 69.

25 Murphy, *Monarchy and the End of Empire*, 187.

states, and her representatives there were selected by the governments there. The «shared monarchy» under an undivided imperial crown, elevated with the Indian title of «emperor» until 1947, was dissolved into national regional monarchies.²⁶ This «downsizing»²⁷ of the imperial British monarchy to a «multi-state Monarchy»²⁸ under a «divided crown»²⁹, which also represented the republics in the Commonwealth, was embedded in multi-tiered separation processes. Separate citizenships were created, national honours systems replaced that of the empire-Commonwealth from the 1960s, and even the Queen's English relinquished its social significance in the shifting of power away from the former metropole.³⁰

It was all different in the nineteenth century and in the first-half of the twentieth century when the imperial monarchy stood for power and was embodied in every British official. When the last Maharaja of the older line of Dewas, one of the small Indian princely states, was asked by a British anthropologist in 1978 how he perceived his own authority, he characterised it as being unbound by constitutional politics but still positioned under British paramountcy, which was represented by a political agent. If the latter said, «Your Highness, it might be better if you didn't do it, [...] you'd better mend your ways».³¹ When his grandfather had failed to heed this rule in the second-half of the nineteenth century, the British Central India Agency nominated a superintendent to bring the state finances into order. According to the Maharaja, the British authority defined what constituted order.³² It always presented itself in the name of the monarchy, which was visually omnipresent in the empire and was also successfully marketed on a commercial level.

In the course of their expansion in Asia and Africa, the European states encountered many different forms of authority, but the majority of them were monarchical.

26 P. Boyce, *The Queen's Other Realms. The Crown and its Legacy in Australia, Canada and New Zealand*, Annandale 2008, 2, 11 («localised monarchies»).

27 D. Cannadine, «From Biography to History: Writing the Modern British Monarchy», in: *Historical Research* 77 (2004) 197, 289–312, 310.

28 B. Pimlott, «Some Thoughts on the Queen and Commonwealth», in: *The Round Table* 87 (1998) 347, 2.

29 P. Murphy in a review, in: *JICH* 37 (2009) 4, 633.

30 Cf. Murphy, *Monarchy*; Boyce, *The Queen's Other Realm*; L. Lloyd, *Diplomacy with a Difference: The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880–2006*, Leiden 2007. K. Fedorowich / C. Bridge, «Family Matters? The Dominion High Commissioners in Wartime Britain, 1938–42», in: *JICH* 40 (2012) 1, 1–23, shows how, as war Premier, Churchill also imposed the «limited monarchy» vis-à-vis the High Commissioners.

31 A. C. Mayer, «Perceptions of Princely Rule: Perspectives from a Biography», in: T. N. Madan (ed.), *War of Life. King, Householder, Renouncer. Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont*, New Delhi 1982, 127–154, 130–131; for the current status of research, see F. Groenhout, «The History of the Indian Princely States: Bringing the Puppets Back onto Centre Stage», in: *History Compass* 4 (2006) 4, 629–644; C. Keen, *Princely India and the British*, London 2012; M. Balzani, *Modern Indian Kingship. Tradition, Legitimacy and Power in Rajasthan*, Oxford 2003.

B. Schnepel, *Die Dschungelkönige. Ethnohistorische Aspekte von Politik und Ritual in Südostindien*, Stuttgart 1997 provides an excellent combination of theoretical conceptualisation and field research.

32 Mayer, «Perceptions of Princely Rule»; similarly, M. Pernau-Reifeld, *Verfassung und politische Kultur im Wandel. Der indische Fürstenstaat Hyderabad 1911–48*, Stuttgart 1992, 55f. It should also be considered that people of high nobility and those from royal families also held high positions in the empire. Cf. S. R. Ashton, «Mountbatten, the Royal Family and British Influence in Post-Independence India and Burma», in: *JICH* 33 (2005) 1, 73–92.

The process of colonisation and imperialism did not lead to a global struggle between monarchy and republic. This is also true of the earlier periods. In his major longitudinal comparison of Southeast Asian and European empires up to the first-third of the nineteenth century, Victor Lieberman discovered an abundance of parallel developments.³³ They included expansive states under monarchical leaders as the driving forces of the empire-building process and as the ones who also determined the events in Africa.

Even if you agree with John Iliffe in identifying «the lack of an overall continental trend» as «a major feature of the nineteenth-century Africa»,³⁴ it is admissible to include the formation of new dominions and the reformation of old ones combined with the increasing territorialisation of authority among the basic developments. These warlike processes were continued in the colonial penetration of Africa by European imperial powers. In general, it was more difficult to develop colonial structures in areas that lacked monarchical authority.³⁵ Irrespective of how they were termed, kings were also central in the African forms of authority.³⁶ This confirms something once noted by Max Weber with characteristic acuity: «The king is everywhere primarily a warlord.»³⁷ Comparable developments in Europe and Africa can be observed in the nineteenth century; however, systematic comparisons between them have yet to be carried out. They present commonalities that have rarely been discussed up to now and will now be the focus of my attention, starting from Europe.

The continental territorial order of the Congress of Vienna built on the destruction of traditional forms of authority. In the entire history of Europe, so many states and their thrones had probably never been destroyed over such a brief period. The princes who survived with their states claimed traditional legitimacy; however, the formation of their states was based on breaks in legitimacy. The revolutionary republic-

33 V. Lieberman, *Strange Parallels. Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830*. Vol. 2: *Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands*, Cambridge 2009, in particular chapter 3. On the central role of kings in the Southeast Asian state and empire building, see H. Kulke, *Kings and Cults. State Formation and Legitimation in India and Southeast Asia*, New Delhi 1993, 262–293.

34 J. Iliffe, *Africans. The History of a Continent*, Cambridge 1995, 164.

35 On Asian regions with long traditions of weak state formation up to the present, see H. Beattie, «Negotiations with the Tribes of Waziristan 1849–1914. The British Experience», in: *JICH* 39 (2011) 4, 571–587; R. Johnson, ««Mizh der beitabora Khalqui-i»: A Comparative Study of Afghan/Pashtun Perspectives on Negotiating with the British and the Soviets», in: *ibid.*, 551–570.

36 I do not go into the inconsistent terminology used to describe African rulers on the different levels of

action. This is not something that distinguishes them from European princes. «King» refers here to the leader based on the dynastic tradition in states or state-like amalgamations. An overview of terminological questions and the gradations in the traditional terms – «chief» is a colonial designation – is provided by J. K. Adjaye / B. Misawa, «Chieftaincy at the Confluence of Tradition and Modernity: Transforming African Rulership in Ghana and Nigeria», in: *International Third World Studies Journal and Review* 17 (2006), 1–10. A general definition of monarchy but related to Africa is provided by R. Lemarchand (ed.), *African Kingships in Perspective. Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings*, London 1977, 8–9.

37 Max Weber *Gesamtausgabe*, I, 22–4, Tübingen 2005, 470. Translation from *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills with a new preface by B. S. Turner, London 2009, 251.

licans and anti-revolutionary monarchies all moved in the same direction: the establishment of legitimacy through the destruction of legitimacy, made possible by victory in war. The war destroyed thrones and erected new ones. That had always been the case everywhere. There was no solidarity among monarchs. Because he was a successful warlord, Napoleon Bonaparte, who was a minor Corsican nobleman and not at all socially acceptable among royals, rose to the rank of emperor, and put his relatives on thrones that he created. He was also recognised by Europe's monarchs and accepted into their exclusive circles through marriage connections. The fact that his military achievements was not institutionalised in the long term was his doing and was not due to the refusal of the hereditary monarchs to recognise the legitimacy of his authority. They completed the territorial princely revolution together. Their main victims were the minor rulers. The same process was repeated fifty years later with the formation of the Italian and German nation states. Once again, the process involved the destruction or subordination of monarchical states by monarchs, but this time in close association with the idea of the «nation», which was equally open to the republic and monarchy. In a variation on Thomas Hobbes, the development can be characterised as *rex regi lupus*.³⁸

The same happened in Africa.³⁹ There were numerous African Bonapartes, one of whom was Mirambo (Mbula Mtyela), the son of a Nyamwezi chief.⁴⁰ As a trader and warlord he established a kingdom in today's Tanzania with periodic hegemony over neighbouring territories. The basis of his success was his ability to surprise his opponents in rapid marches with his highly mobile young warriors, who were trained in the use of European weapons and were generally very disciplined.⁴¹ A contempo-

38 Explored in greater detail in Langewiesche, «Kon-gress-Europa in globalhistorischer Perspektive», in: *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte* 16 (2015) 2, 11–30.

39 On the monarchy in sub-Saharan Africa, which is the focus here, see, in particular, L. Mair, *African Kingdoms*, Oxford 1977; Lemarchand (ed.), *African Kingdoms*; P. C. Lloyd, «The Political Development of West African Kingdom», in: *Journal of African History* 9 (1968) 2, 319–329; D. Forde / P. M. Kaberry (eds.), *West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford 1967; I. Wilks, *Forests of Gold. Essays on the Akan and the Kingdom of Asante*, Athens 1993; L. Harding, *Das Königreich Benin*, München 2010; C.-H. Perrot / F.-X. Fauvelle-Aymar (eds.), *Le retour des rois. Les autorités traditionnelles et l'État en Afrique contemporaine*, Paris 2003 (going back to the nineteenth century); M. R. Doornbos, *The Anko-le Kingship Controversy. Regalia Galore Revisited*, Kampala 2001; A. Eckert, «Ausbeutung und Glanz. Afrikas Monarchien», in: *Kursbuch* 105 (2002), 99–106; R. von Weichs, *Die Rückkehr der Könige von Uganda. Politische Kultur und Moderne in Afrika*, Bielefeld 2013; a good source of information on Af-

rican kings are also these survey studies: E. Isichei, *History of West Africa since 1800*, London 1978; *General History of Africa*, vols. VI–VIII, Berkeley 1998, 1990, 1999.

40 «African» and also «Black Bonaparte», this much-cited designation for Mirambo (see, for example <http://www.blackpast.org/gah/mirambo-ca-1840-1884>) probably originated from H. M. Stanley, *How I found Livingstone. Travels, Adventures, and Discoveries in Central Africa. Including Four Months Residence with Dr. Livingstone*, London 1872, 296, 299, 504. A photo of Mirambo in: *General History of Africa*, vol. VI, 95.

41 R. J. Reid, *Warfare in African History*, Cambridge 2012, 116–117; *ibid.*, «Mutesa and Mirambo: Thoughts on East African Warfare and Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century», in: *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 31 (1998) 1, 73–89; N. R. Bennett, *Mirambo of Tanzania 1840?–1884*, New York 1971, 37: «Mirambo» means «corpse», a reference to his outstanding performance as a warlord.

rary expert had paid similar tributes to Napoleon as a superior master of the fast marches: «The lightning is not quicker than Napoleon.»⁴² Like Napoleon, Mirambo led his soldiers in person into war and was worshipped by them. If the name «Mirambo» were replaced by Napoleon in John Iliffe's study on the history of Tanzania, only a few changes would have to be made to the characterisations.⁴³ Something else that Mirambo and Napoleon had in common was that they were unable to institutionalise their authority in the long term.

There were numerous African military leaders of royal lineage or social climbers who exploited the opportunities offered by war to expand existing kingdoms or build new ones. One of the best known is the Zulu kingdom established by Shaka, the son of a Zulu chief, around 1820. Shaka became the epitome of the warring prince, the military reformer and the state builder. The state structure that he created continued to exist in its basic form until the Zulu kingdom was forced militarily to become part of the British colonial regime in South Africa.⁴⁴ As a century of radical upheaval in states, empires and stateless societies, the nineteenth century also became a century of monarchy in Africa – as was the case in Europe. Colonial rule reinforced the pre-colonial structures of rule and also created hierarchical orders with chiefs, kings and «tribes» in places where they had not previously existed in such forms.⁴⁵

Today, references are being made to the return of the kings in Africa.⁴⁶ Nassirou Bako-Arifari and Pierre-Yves le Meur identified four forms of state policy against the *chefferies* in sub-Saharan Africa from the colonial period to the present day: integration, controlled participation, exclusion and «informalisation» beyond politics. The transitions between these forms were smooth, and the states altered their courses. The authors, who studied the development of Benin in detail, define the *chefferie* as a civil-society institution that is supported both by the government and non-governmental organisations such as Africa Culture, which aims to foster indigenous tradition. Meanwhile, there is a «*véritable inflation de «rois» au Bénin*», and people try to differentiate between hereditary kings from the pre-colonial period and the *chefs de canton*, who were established later on. However, the *chambre nationale des chefs*, which

42 Baron A.-H. de Jomini, *The Art of War*, translated by Capt. G. Mendell and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Philadelphia 1862, 101.

43 J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge 1979, 62–63.

44 See, in particular, E.A. Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 1815–1828*, Cambridge 2014; idem, *Kingdoms and Chiefdoms of Southeastern Africa*, Rochester 2015, ch. 8, 185–206. The best overview of the developments to the present and of the comprehensive research is provided by the 2011 final report of the KwaZulu-Natal-History of Traditional Leadership Project, submitted by Human Sciences Research Council Democracy and Governance (http://www.researchgate.net/publication/2734_84698_

KwaZulu-Natal_history_of_traditional_leadership_project_final_report). The report also provides an overview of the wide-ranging denominations of the entities and leaders in the Zulu society.

45 An account of the current status of research on the invention and reinvention of the systems of rule can be found in R. J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa*, Chichester 2009, 217–220.

46 Cf. in particular: Perrot / Fauvelle-Aymar (eds.), *Le retour des rois*; von Weichs, *Rückkehr der Könige von Uganda*; and E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal / D. I. Ray (eds.), «The New Relevance of Traditional Authorities for Africa's Future», in: *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* (1996), special issue.

was eventually established, is not an indication of mere «re-traditionalisation», but represents new dynamics that are linked to the reference to the past. The *conseils des rois du Bénin* supported this by funding scientific conferences, among other things. Politically, the institution of the local and cantonal *chefs* helps to decentralise the state of Benin – which emerged from a large number of heterogeneous pre-colonial territories, including a myriad of kingdoms.⁴⁷ We may refer here to the «invention of tradition». Numerous «*entrepreneurs politico-culturels*», including anthropologists who study such traditions, are involved in this process.⁴⁸

Bunyoro, one of five regional monarchies with cultural and political roles in the Republic of Uganda today illustrates just how enduring African monarchies can be despite all kinds of setbacks.⁴⁹ Once the main power in the vast lake territory in the sixteenth century, it remained a powerful state thereafter, with its Mukama («King») Kabarega succeeding in contributing to the African military revolution of the nineteenth century.⁵⁰ However, Kabarega's troops were defeated by the (mostly African) troops led by British officers who were allied with the neighbouring state of Buganda, and the struggles culminated in a bloody guerrilla war.⁵¹

Just as a monarchical «community of accrued gain» formed militarily in post-1800 Europe, and its states or empires expanded against and with Napoleon, similar military alliances arose between European imperialists and African sub-imperialists.⁵² The European «scramble for Africa» was matched by an African «scramble for

47 N. Bako-Arifari / P.-Y. le Meur, «La chefferie au Bénin: une résurgence ambiguë», in: Perrot / Fauvelle-Aymar (eds.), *Le retour des rois*, 125–143. For a detailed account of today's *chef traditionnel* as mediator between tradition and the present, state and society, see E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, *L'État en Afrique face à la chefferie. Le cas du Togo*, Paris 2000; idem / R. van Dijk (eds.), *African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape*, Hamburg 1999.

48 Cf. D. M. Gordon, «(Dis)Embodying Sovereignty. Divine Kingship in Central African Historiography», in: *The Journal of African History* 57 (2016) 1, 46–67. Reid, *Modern Africa*, refers to the period from 1880 to 1920 as an «an era of «histories in the making», during which African groups and states established their positions in the colonial system (167).

49 On the following, cf. J. Willis, «A Portrait for the Mukama: Monarchy and Empire in Colonial Bunyoro, Uganda», in: *JICH* 34 (2006) 1, 105–122; G. Prunier, «Les restaurations monarchiques en Ouganda», in: Perrot / Fauvelle-Aymar, *Le retour des rois*, 343–359; H. Médard, «La légitimité au-delà des échecs. La force du mythe d'un roi norricier et protecteur au Buganda (Ouganda)», in: *ibid.*, 361–379; F. Iroko, «Rois et chefs en République du Bénin (1960–1999)», in: *ibid.*, 111–123; D. A. Low, *Fabrica-*

tion of Empire. The British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890–1902, Oxford 2009 (on the numerous kingdoms in the territory of Uganda); C. Johannessen, «Kingship in Uganda. The Role of the Buganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics», paper read at Makerere University, 2005; von Weichs, *Rückkehr der Könige von Uganda*; Doornbos, *Ankole Kingship Controversy*, on the different assessments of the institution of the monarchy in the Ugandan regions. M. Karlström, «Imagining Democracy: Political Culture and Democratisation in Buganda», in: *Africa* 66 (1996) 4, 485–505. is an excellent field study. Reid, *Warfare*, ch. 5, 108.

50 *Ibid.*, 137, 139; J. Beattie, *Bunyoro. An African Kingdom*, New York 1960, 20–24; Low, *Uganda Kingdoms*, ch. 7; cf. Mair, *African Kingdoms*, 18–19.; on subsequent developments, see C. Wrigley, *Kingship and State. The Buganda Dynasty*, Cambridge 1996; C. Young, «Buganda», in: Lemarchand (ed.), *African Kingdoms*, 193–235; on the reorganisation of the administration and impact on the institution of the king and chief, see D. E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda. A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism*, Princeton 1961.

52 For a detailed account of sub-imperialism, see L. H. Gann / P. Duignan, *The Rulers of British Africa, 1870–1914*, London 1978, inter alia 359 on the kings and great chiefs of Lozi, Buganda and Basutoland.

protection».⁵³ However, unlike in Europe, the sequence of state destruction and state formation in Africa was not legalised through an agreement that copper-fastened the gains of those who had cooperated in the wars and established a recognised state system. The stronger power prevailed, and it was the European one. Nonetheless, the European power remained reliant both militarily and administratively on the help of the indigenous people, and above all, the indigenous elites, which included the kings. Both, the elites and the kings, were also needed as «cultural brokers»,⁵⁴ particularly as the «intermediate rulers» between the local population and the colonial state, in which they were assigned the role of the administrative elite.⁵⁵

When Bunyoro's King Kabarega was forced into exile on the Seychelles in 1899, the British continued to build on the authority of the institution of the monarchy. They also maintained the blood-based right to rule when they appointed two sons of the banished king in succession. However, their rule was interrupted when the borders of Buganda were defined in the Uganda Agreement of 1900. This military ally of the British was allocated a considerable proportion of Bunyoro and its chiefs were able to occupy positions in the remainder of the kingdom. It was an agreement between the victorious kings, namely an African one and the British one, at the expense of the inferior king. The symbolic language of the agreement made it clear where the power laid. The Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India was represented by «Her Majesty's Special Commissioner, Commander-in-Chief and Consul-General for the Uganda Protectorate and the adjoining Territories».

The removal of King of Bunyoro from power disrupted the established system of patronage, in which the king and his chiefs had their permanent places and were ultimately not replaceable. For this reason, the British administration changed its rules repeatedly as it did in many parts of its empire, including in the Indian principalities.⁵⁶ In Bunyoro, it upgraded the position of the king again in the 1920s. When a British anthropologist spent time there working on field research in the 1950s, the people still expressed the belief that Kabarega had done what a good king must do, that is, defend his country and people, and maintain their rights.⁵⁷ Kabarega Day has been celebrated in the reconstituted regional kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara since 1999; meanwhile, Kabarega is seen in Buganda as a king who failed to recognise the signs of the time.⁵⁸

53 G. L. Caplan, *The Elites of Barotseland 1878–1969. A Political History of Zambia's Western Province*, Berkeley 1970, in particular, ch. 3: «The Scramble for Protection».

54 A. Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten. Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920–1970*, München 2007, 21.

55 M. Krämer, «Vom administrativen zum konkurrenzziellen Häuptlingstum. Anmerkungen zur Legitimität und Transformation neotraditionaler Herrschaft in Namibia und KwaZulu-Natal, Südafrika»,

in: *Sociologus* 59 (2009) 2, 173–198 discusses the controversial literature on this; cf. Adjaye / Misawa, «African Rulership in Ghana and Nigeria».

56 Cf. the case studies by Jeffrey, «Politics of Indirect Rule» (on Travancore) and by J. McLeod, «A Numerous, Illiterate, and Irresponsible Bhayab: The Maharao of Kutch, their Nobles and the British Paramount Power, 1816–1947», in: *JICH* 35 (2007) 3, 371–391.

57 Beattie, *Bunyoro*, 22.

58 Weichs, *Rückkehr der Könige von Uganda*, 82–85.

The British administration relied repeatedly on the functions and authorities of the king over the course of the twentieth century, but it had not actually designated him with such characteristics for a time. While the Uganda Agreement of 1900 had no reservations about translating the traditional designation *Kabaka* with «King» – as could be seen when Edward VII greeted the Litunga of Barotseland with «Your Majesty» at his coronation in 1902⁵⁹ –, a fierce struggle surrounding the K-word started in the 1920s.⁶⁰ Although the representatives of the British crown wanted indirect rule, they did not rely entirely on the «veneration of monarchs without monarchical power».⁶¹ Instead, they attempted at times, in Africa at least, to strip the indigenous rulers of their monarchical aura in order to demonstrate their distance from the British monarch. However, it was not possible to adhere to this strategy consistently. The Bunyoro Agreement of 1933 treated the Mukama of Bunyoro *de facto* as king, and it even defined the line of succession in detail for the first time. In 1938, the British District Commissioner warned Mukama of Bunyoro against repeatedly referring to the «Kingdom of Bunyoro»: There was only one king – King George. However, the British lost this struggle for the monopoly on monarchy in their empire. The British symbolic idiom had been mastered in the protectorate and was used when high representatives ceremoniously greeted the remote overlords. The kings, whom the British administration did not want to call «kings», appropriated the British ritual and assigned themselves the position of kingship. The «ornamentation», through which the metropole wished to impress its value system on the entire empire, became a political weapon in the self-assertion of the African kings and the order that they represented.⁶² They occasionally played the British monarchs off against one another in the process. Take, for example, the representatives of the Kikuyu, who lived in segmented societies and were assigned a paramount chief for the first time under British administration so that they could be «governed». They met with the judge Sir Morris Carter and the Kenya Land Commission in 1932 and they wanted to know why the land that had been «stolen» from them by the white settlers had not been returned to them after the First World War, and when the return of the land would happen. One of their spokesmen, Andrew Gathe, a member of the Anglican Church asked: «Is the rule of King George one and the same as the rule of Queen Victoria?» Had this queen not stated that whoever came to her country would live with them side by side as friends? He then used a modern gender-based argument: Was Victoria unable to assert herself because she was a woman? Would they be given back their land as the queen had promised, now that a man ruled as king?⁶³

59 H. Nicholls, *South Africa in my Time*, London 1961, 43.

60 For a detailed account of this and the following, see Willis, «Portrait for Mukama».

61 Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten*, 44 (the position of the then-Governor Donald Cameron).

62 For a penetrating account, see Willis, «Portrait for Mukama»; J. Lonsdale, «Ornamental Constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta and the Two Queens», in: *JICH* 34 (2006) 1, 87–103.

63 Lonsdale, «Ornamental Constitutionalism», 88. On questions of gender in monarchy research, see

Hence, societies that did not have any kings were also able to adopt the image of the powerful British monarch, which was disseminated in many ways in the Empire, and make claims of unfulfilled promises and ancestral rights as they placed themselves under the protection of the ruler. This was a very common argument. For example, as «the children of the Great Queen», the kings of the three Botswana states claimed imperial protection against colonisation by the British South Africa Company. When the three kings travelled to London together in 1895, they repeatedly presented their claim to the British public to remain «under the Government of the Great Queen», as stated in a petition.⁶⁴ This claim for protection could also be made in religious terms by referring to the British king as «Defender of the Faith», as the British monarch is still officially called today. When Elijah Makiwane, President of the Native Educational Association, launched a severe attack on the idea of the general superiority of the Europeans in a speech made in colonial South Africa in 1885, he hailed Victoria not only as the queen but also as a mother. He couched this eulogy in Biblical English to appeal to Victoria as «a queen of equality and civil rule in the philanthropic sense of the word»: «Long may she live. Oh, Queen Victoria, thou shalt never know how many hearts even in the far off Africa thou hast cheered in their passage through «the wilderness of this world.» Thou art not only a Queen, but a Mother. Prosper thou in all places; prosper thou in South Africa.»⁶⁵ This appeal may be identified as an African adaptation of the welfare monarchy; however, it could equally refer back to African traditions. From the point at which it was forced to surrender its power to parliament and government, the image of a monarchy that looked after the societal well-being and welfare became one of the pillars of the legitimacy of the British monarchy – and not just the British one.⁶⁶ The trust in the imperial monarchy and its duty of care could also be transformed into the rhetoric of human rights.⁶⁷ However, as the epitome of «ornamentalism» in Africa, the British monarchy initially continued to present itself as a power institution. This corresponded entirely with Victoria's self-image as a queen with «an almost medieval idea of her own personal authority».⁶⁸

for Africa the studies published in: F.E.S. Kaplan (ed.), *Queens, Queens Mothers, Priestesses, and Power. Case Studies in African Gender*, New York 1997; for Great Britain before 1914, see C. C. Orr, «The Feminization of the Monarchy 1780–1910: Royal Masculinity and Female Empowerment», in: A. Olechnowicz (ed.), *The Monarchy and the British Nation 1780 to the Present*, Cambridge 2007, 76–107; D. Thompson, *Queen Victoria. Gender and Power*, London 2001.

64 N. Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great White Queen. Victorian Britain through African Eyes*, Chicago 1998, 60. Since Botswana's independence, members of the royal family have repeatedly held senior state offices, including that of president.

65 Quoted after L. de Kock, «Sitting for the Civilization Test: The Masking(s) of a Civil Imaginary in Coloni-

al South Africa», in: *Politics Today* 22 (2001) 2, 391–412, 406. De Kock sees this above all as the attempt to defend the idea of a shared «civility» for Africans and Europeans against «a racist colonial society». S. Dubow, «How British was the British World? The Case of South Africa», in: *JICH* 37 (2009) 1, 1–27, 12, also presents solid arguments as to why such hopes on the part of «South Africa's black Victorians» should not be dismissed as naive or misplaced. It should also be noted that equality before the king was part of the African idea of kingship. Cf. Karlström, «Imagining Democracy», 489–490.

66 Cf. F. Prochaska, *Royal Bounty. The Making of a Welfare Monarchy*, New Haven 1995.

67 Lonsdale, «Ornamental Constitutionalism», 91.

68 J. Loughlin, «Royal Agency and State Integration:

The image of the powerful monarch did not die with the empire. In a letter transmitted in due form by its chairperson via the British High Commissioner, in 2004, the Kenya African National Union asked Queen Elizabeth to eliminate the blockade of the negotiations of a new constitution for Kenya. «We respect the maturity of Her Majesty,» it stated. As «the head of the Commonwealth and elder among elders», she would be in a position to chair a conference to regulate the unresolved issues, which, according to the authors, included the demands for reparations for the cruelty committed during the war by the colonial entities.⁶⁹ From the perspective of those requesting her help, as Head of the Commonwealth, the British Queen was not a «crowned non-entity».⁷⁰ In a similar way to the functioning of the consultation circles of African rulers,⁷¹ they ascribed capacities to her that went beyond the statutory rights. At the same time, they invoked the claim of an imperial trusteeship, which had been repeatedly propagated by the colonial administration, and based the demand for aid in the form of authority and money on it. According to John Lonsdale, this promise of trusteeship was historically rooted in the image of the «globalising Mother-Queen, Victoria the Good» and renewed in a form that was tailored to the specific situations in many individual locations.⁷² In the European context, the residents of Gibraltar displayed a similar attitude in basing their demand for protection against Spain on their expressions of loyalty to the British crown.⁷³

3. Why have Monarchies Survived?

Monarchy is easy to understand; the republic is not. Walter Bagehot saw this as the most important advantage of the monarchical form of the state in his lifetime.⁷⁴ His famous formulation to the effect that the constitutional monarchy has three rights – to be consulted, to encourage and to warn – is the result of an unsparing diagnosis. According to this diagnosis, unlike the republic, the constitutional monarchy could succeed with people at the top and the very bottom of society who did not really understand what was going on in the state. To rely on a hereditary capacity to govern

Ireland, Wales and Scotland in a Monarchical Context, 1840s-1921», in: *JICH* 41 (2013) 3, 377–402, 382. Loughlin refers here to the contemporary assessment by E. Gosse, «The Character of the Queen Victoria», in: *Quarterly Review* 3 (1901), 321–350. Cf. Bogdanor's assessment in *Monarchy and the Constitution*.

69 Lonsdale, «Ornamental Constitutionalism», 99; A.A. Blomfield, «East Africa Correspondent», in: *The Telegraph*, 30.7.2004.

70 R. Craggs / H. Kumarasingham, «Losing an Empire and Building a Role: The Queen, Geopolitics and the Construction of the Commonwealth Headship at the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 1979», in: *JICH* 43 (2015) 1, 80–98, 95.

71 Cf. Mair, *African Kingdoms*, ch. VII: «The Balance of Power».

72 Lonsdale, «Ornamental Constitutionalism», 99. On the «subversive subtext», see H. Sapire, «African Loyalism and its Discontents: The Royal Tour of South Africa, 1947», in: *The Historical Journal* 54 (2011) 1, 215–240.

73 S. Constantine, «Monarchy and Constructing Identity in «British» Gibraltar, c. 1800 to the Present», in: *JICH* 34 (2006) 1, 23–44.

74 W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution, and Other Political Essays*, New York 1889, ch. III: «The Monarchy», 101–156. Cf. D.C. Craig: «Bagehot's Republicanism», in: Olechnowicz (ed.), *Monarchy and British Nation*, 139–162.

both flew in the face of historical experience and was dangerous. The monarch could acquire and transmit useful knowledge, but this could also be achieved without him if the parliament assumed the responsibility for finding a capable government. The true value of the monarch was that he was a permanent fixture. His most important task was to conceal what «our real rulers»⁷⁵ did from the masses.

This view clearly reflects Bagehot's elitist scepticism of the democracy of the masses: «The masses of Englishmen are not fit for an elective government.»⁷⁶ However, he also refers to a core function of the monarch and not just that of the constitutional one. Unlike the head of the republic, who is elected for a certain period, the monarch can authenticate both political and societal upheavals with the legitimacy of his office, which is based on longer periods of dynastic continuity. If the monarch participates in breaking with tradition either passively or actively, he sets a high threshold of resistance for those who do not agree with such decisions. For this reason, the cooperation of established kings equally facilitated the imposition of imperial rule in Asia and Africa, the paths to fascist dictatorship in Italy in 1922 and the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain in 1923. On the other hand, the king was often the focal point of resistance. Whatever the king would do, he could ensure not only the survival of the monarchy but also its destruction if it had the misfortune to be on the losing side. This did not ultimately depend on the monarchy but on many different development factors, one of which is and was the monarchy itself.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were shaped by the emergence and destruction of states and empires. The institution of the monarchy successfully asserted itself in these processes in many parts of the world – but not everywhere. The reasons for this were highly complex; however, it is possible to identify certain basic principles, three of which I would like to highlight here:

(1) *Monarchy as an Emotional Centre of Nation and Empire*

As an institution, the monarchy was best positioned to integrate itself into the comprehensive transformation of politics, society and culture, as well as to assert itself when it became the emotional centre of national and imperial expectations. Japan's transformation into a centralised nation state after the Meiji Revolution is an example of the monarchy's successful repositioning of itself.⁷⁷ Among the crowned heads of the great empires, the British monarchy was uniquely successful because its success as an empire was also one of a kind. The monarchy contributed here as one actor amongst many. Victoria as the embodiment of Greater Britain was the creation of many – in Great Britain and in the Empire.⁷⁸ Her image as «the matriarch of the

⁷⁵ Bagehot, *Constitution*, 122.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Cf. T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy. Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*, Berkeley 1998.

⁷⁸ To indicate the spectrum of actors involved: What

Cannadine presents as «ornamentalism» on many levels in the metropole and in the empire is put forward by W.M. Kuhn, *Democratic Royalism. The Transformation of the British Monarchy*, London 1996 as the creation of a «renewed ceremonial style

British nation» and as the representative of the empire were intertwined with each other, and this enabled her to become the «patriot queen».⁷⁹ The basis for this was the success of the British Empire, which offered its monarchy new roles. Both factors combined – namely the loss of political power in the metropole and the representation of imperial power – established an unassailable position for the British monarchy. Weak nation states and weak empires were unable to do this. Although the Spanish king had himself named Alfonso the African, he did not become an imperial identification figure. Instead, the war in Morocco in 1911 led to a republican mutiny in the navy and a general strike against the regime. The weakness in the remaining colonial empire destabilised Spain. Although Alfonso XIII legitimised Primo de Rivera's military putsch in 1923 and referred to him as «my Mussolini», the institutionalisation of this dictatorship was unsuccessful. It could not be dismantled by the monarch either. The election of 1931 had the effect of a negative plebiscite on the monarchy that no longer enjoyed the support of the army.⁸⁰

Under both the Spanish and Italian systems of government, the monarch was required to make political decisions. The king was also presented as the embodiment of the nation and the empire in Italy;⁸¹ however, the ministers and members of parliament expected him to correct the defects of the Italian parliamentarism,⁸² as described by Sidney Sonnino, who in a controversial article of 1897 called on the king to finally take political action.⁸³ Despite being long associated with Mazzini, Francesco Crispi vaunted the monarchy as the guarantor of Italian unity in contrast to the republic. However, he noted in private that while they had put their faith in the House of Savoy as a family of soldiers, in reality they were left with a bourgeois

for the monarchy» (141) by individuals. J. Perry, «Whig Monarchy, Whig Nation: Crown, Politics and Representativeness 1800–2000», in: Olechnowicz (ed.), *Monarchy and British Nation*, 47–75, argues convincingly that the altered political context had a greater influence on the image of the monarchy and its transformation than royal behaviour. Another important actor in the transformation of the image of the monarch is the media, which are examined in many studies; cf. J. Plunkett, *Queen Victoria. First Media Monarch*, Oxford 2003.

79 D. Bell, «The Idea of a Patriot Queen? The Monarchy, the Constitution, and the Iconographic Order of Greater Britain, 1860–1900», in: *JICH* 34 (2006) 1, 3–21, 16. Cf. D. Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain. Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900*, Princeton 2007. For the African perspective, see Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great White Queen*.

80 J. Moreno-Luzón, *Modernizing the Nation. Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931*, Brighton 2012.

81 C. Brice, *Monarchie et identité nationale en Italie (1861–1900)*, Paris 2010; she examines inter alia the regions in which memorials to Victor Emanuel II were erected and which of the myriad associations were monarchical, republican or socialist in their orientation. On the active ceremonial role of Queen Margherita, see Brice, «Queen Margherita (1851–1926) «The Only Man in the House of Savoy»», in: R. Schulte (ed.), *The Body of the Queen. Gender and Rule in the Courtly World, 1500–2000*, New York 2006, 195–215; A. Schwarzenbach, *Königliche Träume. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Monarchie von 1789 bis 1997*, München 2012.

82 On the following, cf. C. Duggan, «Francesco Crispi, «The Problem of the Monarchy, and the Origins of Italian Nationalism»», in: *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 15 (2010) 3, 336–353, 350–351, 337; Duggan, *Francesco Crispi, 1818–1901. From Nation to Nationalism*, Oxford 2002.

83 S. Sonnino, «Torniamo allo Statuto», in: *Nuova antologia*, 1.1.1897, 9–28, 25–26.

family, which was too small for Rome because, as the capital city of the world, it needed a major monarchy.⁸⁴ Crispi had the German emperor and Bismarck in mind here. In this political environment, the monarchy could not grow into a role like the British one – shielded from government policy and, therefore, not responsible for it. The fact that the monarchy failed in Italy was not due to the individual inability of the kings to fulfil their role, but to the developments that were beyond their control.

The same cannot be said for the German monarchies. Up to and during the First World War, the Prussian-German emperor in particular adhered to the fiction reinforced by the national wars of unification of the military prince, who determined the fate of the nation on the battlefield.⁸⁵ However, after Napoleon Bonaparte, the era of the military king, who led his troops into war and commanded them, had passed in Europe. A monarch who did not realise this – in contrast to the German emperor, the Russian Tsar took over the supreme command in person in 1915 – paid for the defeat in the First World War with his throne. From the entry of the USA into the war both sides had re-flagged the war into a fight amongst two opposing concepts of state. However, the complex environment here was also the deciding factor as there were monarchies on both sides of the warring parties. Russia withdrew from the alliance with the western powers because the rule of the tsar had been terminated through revolution. It is impossible to know whether, in the absence of the peace conditions imposed by the allied victors, the German monarchies would have survived the defeat in the war as an institution and opened up to full parliamentarisation. Despite the fact that the fiction of the kingly commander-in-chief had been played out there too, the monarchy in militarily inferior Belgium emerged stronger from the First World War. However, Belgium was on the side of the victors, and because he had stood by his troops, it was possible to honour Albert after his death as the king-soldier even though he died in a fatal mountain-climbing accident. His wife Elisabeth also found a role as «queen-nurse» and her daughter-in-law Astrid, who died in a traffic accident, as «mother of the nation». Hence the civil deaths did not hinder the war-related heroisation of the royal family. All of these images arose from carefully designed staging, but as demonstrated by letters among other things, they elicited a response from the population. Accordingly, the imagination of the monarchy was a national collective effort in this case too.⁸⁶

84 Duggan, «Crispi», 66.

85 L. Machtan, *Die Abdankung. Wie Deutschlands gekrönte Häupter aus der Geschichte fielen*, Berlin 2008.

86 C. de Spiegeleer, «Royal Losses, Symbolic Politics and Media Events in Interwar Europe: Responses to the Accidental Deaths of King Albert I and Queen Astrid of Belgium (1934–1935)», in: *Contemporary European History* 24 (2015) 2, 155–174, quotations taken from 159, 160, 162.

M. van Ginderachter, «Public Transcripts of Royalism. Pauper Letters to the Belgian Royal Family (1880–1940)», in: J. Deploige / G. Deneckere (eds.), *Mystifying the Monarch. Studies on Discourse, Power, and History*, Amsterdam 2006, 205–222.

The complex environment was the main factor that decided on the monarchy. This is also evident in imperially ruled states and societies. While Great Britain permanently destroyed Burma's monarchy by annexing the country and integrating it into the administration of British India, it allowed the sultanates of Malaysia to remain in place and amalgamated them into several protectorates, including the Federated States of Malaya.⁸⁷ Although a colonial official referred to these sultans as «unhappy dummies» who agreed with everything suggested to them, they were allowed to remain in office, and their positions were stabilised and strengthened, a development that enabled them to become the focal points of a specific Malaysian identity in the long term.⁸⁸ After independence (1963), they developed into a symbol of national unity in the context of serious domestic-political disputes about parliamentarisation, federalisation and the status of ethnic-religious minorities. Today, Malaysia is a federal parliamentary elected hereditary monarchy with a politically dominant federal level.⁸⁹ The king of the Federation – whose period of office is strictly limited to five years – is selected by the nine regional monarchs from their circle. Eight of these are hereditary monarchs (seven sultans and one raja) and the ninth is elected by the council of district chiefs from the princes in his federal state.⁹⁰ There is probably no other monarchy in the world with a more flexible constitutional structure. In terms of its self-image, it sees itself as being deeply rooted in the past; however, according to one of the crown princes in 2004, it was «re-invented» as a supra-ethnic combination of monarchy, democracy and Islam. The religious ethnisation of politics is a central problem, however. The crown prince ascribes a central role to the monarchy here by valuing it as a symbol of national unity and as an ethnic bridge-builder: «... a kind of invisible social glue helping to bind us. It is true that it is a potent symbol of this being the «Land of the Malays» and is thereby primarily a bastion of Malay culture helping to identify the Malays as the definitive people. But it is not exclusive. The Monarchy is extended to Malaysians of all ethnic groups who accept its constitutional identity and live comfortably with its Malay-oriented social dimension. The Monarchy, by its very nature, is a force for moderation over extremism. It can be seen as a bedrock of the constitutional process.»

Democracy provides the avenue by which the various constituencies can give voice to the way they choose to be governed. It is government by consent and compat-

87 Cf. C. D. Cowan, *The Origins of British Control in Malaysia, 1867–1878*, London 1955; B. W. Andaya / L. Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, London 1982, ch. 4–5.

88 Cf. S. C. Smith, «Moving a Little with the Tide: Malay Monarchy and the Development of Modern Malay Nationalism», in: *JICH* 34 (2006) 1, 123–138, quotation taken from 125; A. Milner, «Identity Monarchy: Interrogating Heritage for a Divided Malaysia», in: *Southeast Asian Studies* 1 (2012) 2, 191–

212; W. R. Roff, *The Origins of Malaya Nationalism*, New Haven, London 1967.

89 F. Holst, «Das föderale System in Malaysia: Starker Schein und schwaches Sein?», in: *Jahrbuch des Föderalismus* (2013), 437–447. Holst defines Malaysia's system of government as competition authoritarianism. The sultans have considerable rights of code-termination in all Islamic institutions.

90 A. Harding, *The Constitution of Malaysia*, Oregon 2012.

ible with Constitutional Monarchy. The Ruler [that is, the Sultan] plays an important and effective role in maintaining a democratic parliamentary system by remaining politically neutral and being seen to be unbiased.⁹¹

Another kind of national identity with the monarchy at its core developed in Thailand. Here too, it arose from the specific history of an old kingdom that was never colonised by European states. The monarchy is presented as the only institution that the country has to thank for this anti-imperialistic self-assertion while simultaneously embodying a link with the country's own imperial past. The monarchy is staged in many forums as the incarnation of a Thai nation with its very own «Thai way of democracy»,⁹² using a complex system of ceremonies and rituals, which is coordinated – successfully up to now – by a National Identity Board based on the maxims of nation, religion and monarchy.⁹³ Under King Bhumibol, who was in office from 1946 until his death in 2016, the institution of the monarchy has not only survived numerous military coups, political upheavals and constitutional changes unscathed, it appears to be far more stable today than in the early years of the king's reign when the transition to a new constitutional form was still uncertain following the collapse of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The institution of the monarchy gave the military governments historically rooted legitimacy,⁹⁴ and it obtained from them the necessary means to strengthen the monarchy as the cultural heart of the nation. It has yet to face a democratic challenge.

The numerous principalities in India did not offer any point at which the national independence movements could have taken a foothold. They created new symbols of unity that were republican in their orientation. In particular, monarchies were not available as an integrating force in the parts of India that were directly administered by Great Britain. Nonetheless, the regional princes also remained culturally important in India, where all monarchical rights and titles were rescinded by law in 1971.⁹⁵

(2) Monarchy as a Polycentric System of Authority

In the research on early modern Europe, it has proved useful to work with concepts such as «composite monarchy» and «conglomerate empires». In Germany, the analogous term *zusammengesetzter Staat* was still widely used by legal scholars in the

91 Public Lecture by His Royal Highness Raja Nazrin Shah Ibni Sultan Azlan Shah, Crown Prince of Perak Darul Ridzuan: *The Monarchy in Contemporary Malaysia*, Singapore 2004, 4–5.

92 A penetrating analysis can be found in J. Fong, «Sacred Nationalism: The Thai Monarchy and Primal Nation Construction», in: *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 39 (2009) 4, 673–696.

93 A. Whittacker, *Abortion, Sin and the State in Thailand*, New York 2004, 79 (in the 1980s the commission formulated twelve desirable and five undesirable values).

94 K. Hewison, «A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup», in: *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 38 (2008) 1, 190–211, shows the extent of the palace's involvement in the military coup of 2006.

95 Balzani, *Modern Indian Kingship*. For Orissa, Hardenberg confirms the demise in the significance of rituals, however the idea of kingship still offers an ideology for many that is a source of orientation in everyday life. R. Hardenberg, *König ohne Reich. Rituale eines Königtums in Orissa*, Berlin 2008, 239f.

nineteenth century: It is based on older terms such as *respublica mixta* and *respublicae compositae*.⁹⁶ The term «polycentric monarchies» has been used recently in relation to the early modern Spanish and Portuguese empires.⁹⁷ These historiographical terms and social science studies relating to present times contest the idea of a uniformly organised and acting state. This opposition to the image of the unitarian central state is inherent in the institution of the monarchy. As an institution, it predates the centralisation-based bureaucratic state – even if it adapted to it and acted as a driver of its development.

Although royal titles no longer have any kind of political significance, the diversity of the monarchies that emerged over the course of history is conserved in their long-term endurance, in some cases to the present day. For example, the Danish parliament allowed the constitution that was passed in 1953 to be proclaimed by Frederick IX, «by God's grace King of Denmark, the Wends and Goths, Duke of Schleswig, Holstein, Stormarn, Ditmarschen, Lauenburg and Oldenburg».⁹⁸ This did not represent any threat of war against Germany and Sweden because the Swedish king also referred to himself as King of the Wends and Goths until 1973. The British king did not refrain from using the title «King of France» until 1801, and right up to the end of the Habsburg Empire, its monarch's lengthy title listed all crown lands, including those that had been lost to other states. The title «King of Jerusalem» was also «shared» by the Habsburg emperor and some other pretenders in Europe.⁹⁹

The royal titles provide a record of the territorial diversity of monarchical authority. They are reminiscent of the ability of the monarchy to link together territories that are independent in terms of their legal and military order or even in their religious and ethnical structure. For this reason, the secret behind the imperial success of the British monarchy has been identified as the establishing of «conflicting and contradictory allegiances across the empire».¹⁰⁰ With regard to the empires, the monarchy proved to be an institution that was endowed with the appropriate historical experience for dominion over territories that could not be administered centrally. The comparative research carried out on this topic up to now has been concentrated on Europe and the European empires in South America. The diversity of the African state

96 Cf. H. G. Koenigsberger, «Dominium Regale or Dominion Politicum et Regale. Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe», in: idem, *Politicians and Virtuosi. Essays in Early Modern History*, London 1986, 1–25; J. H. Elliott, «A Europe of Composite Monarchies», in: *Past and Present* 137 (1992), 48–71; H. Gustafsson, «Conglomerates or Unitary States? Integration Processes in Early Modern Denmark-Norway and Sweden», in: T. Fröschl (ed.), *Föderationsmodelle und Unionsstrukturen. Staatenverbindungen in der frühen Neuzeit vom 15. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, Wien, München 1994, 45–62; D. Langewiesche, «Der europäische Kleinstaat im 19. Jahrhundert und die frühneuzeitliche Tradition des

zusammengesetzten Staates», in: idem (ed.), *Kleinstaaten in Europa*, Schaan 2007, 95–117.

97 P. Cardim et al. (eds.), *Polycentric Monarchies. How did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?*, Eastbourne 2012.

98 <http://www.verfassungen.eu/dk/>

99 Cf. J. Coakley, «Kingdoms, Republics, and People's Democracies: Legitimacy and National Identity in European Constitutions», in: *National Identities* 13 (2011) 1, 267–285.

100 D. Lowry, «The Crown, Empire Loyalism and the Assimilation of Non-British White Subjects in the British World: An Argument against «Ethnic Determinism»», in: *JICH* 31 (2003) 2, 96–130, 116.

and empire formations could also be analysed from this perspective. This does not have to involve focusing a European-South American light on Africa; independent African developments could be adopted for intercultural comparisons. If the Asante Empire of the nineteenth century is described by experts using categories such as «confederate chiefdoms» with hereditary rulers¹⁰¹ or «unity in diversity» embedded in the dynastic structure, and the capacity to adapt to rapid change is explained by the structure,¹⁰² it should be clear that the concepts developed on the basis of European and South American history can correspond to African experiences. Current republics with regional monarchies such as Uganda and Botswana, as well as other African states with parliaments that include a House of Traditional Leaders, could be integrated into comparative analyses without referring to external criteria.¹⁰³

Africa presents a particularly suitable area for the study. Although only three of the African states (Lesotho, Morocco and Swaziland) are among the 44 monarchies included in today's 193 UN member states, the majority of the numerous regional monarchies that exist in the world are located in African republics.¹⁰⁴ Hence the reconciliation between the monarchy and the republic is also an African phenomenon of the recent post-colonial period. Even if religious-spiritual tasks assume a more prominent role than others in Africa, the regional African kings do not in any way limit themselves to these areas. For example, in the minds of the people, King Ngwa'fo III of Mankon, one of the numerous micro-kingdoms in the western highlands of the Republic of Cameroon, embodies their state, culture and history right back to its mythical beginnings. The term «embody» should be understood here in the literal sense as explained by the anthropologist Jean-Pierre Warnier. He refers to King Ngwa'fo accordingly as a «pot-king» («roi-pot»), ascribes sacrality to him and, in

101 J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, Cambridge 2005, 84. Autobiographically: A. A. Boahen et al. (eds.), *Otumfuo, Nana Agyeman Prempeh I, The History of Ashanti Kings and the Whole Country itself, and Other Writings*, Oxford 2003.

102 I. Wilks, *Asante in the Nineteenth Century. The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order*, Cambridge 1975, 371–373; M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton, 1996, refers to indirect rule as «decentralized despotism». Lange, «State Formation», 123, suggests that it hampered the post-independence establishment of a rational bureaucratic state.

103 On the Provincial House and the continuing significance of the traditional Zulu chiefs, see the KwaZulu-Natal-History of Traditional Leadership Project; A. S. Mackinnon, «Chiefly Authority, Leapfrogging Headmen and the Political Economy of Zululand, South Africa, ca. 1930–1950», in: *Journal of Southern African Studies* 27 (2001) 3, 567–590; S. Marks, «Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the

Ideology of Segregation», in: *ibid.* 4 (1978) 2, 172–194. The fact that the influences beyond state borders in the decolonisation phase can also be made visible through the monarchies is demonstrated by L. Cantwell, «Chiefly Power in a Frontline State: Kgosi Linchwe II, the Bakgatla and Botswana in the South African Liberation Struggle, 1948–1994», in: *ibid.* 41 (2015) 2, 255–272.

104 The Wikipedia article on monarchy (viewed on 18.1.2016) lists 38 «subnational monarchies», of which 16 are African, located in republics. The figure of 38 is considerably underestimated. There are far more than 16 regional monarchies in Africa – there are even more than 16 in Cameroon alone. See, for example, the long list of «chefferie» or «fondom» in Cameroon in the Wikipedia article «Chefferie traditionnelle au Cameroun» (https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chefferie_traditionnelle_au_Cameroun, viewed on 26.1.2016). D. Quigley (ed.), *The Character of Kingship*, Oxford, New York, 2005, 2, stresses that one country – one monarchy was never the rule in Asia, African and the Pacific.

a variation of Ernst Kantorowicz's two-body theory, refers to the three bodies of the Mankon king.¹⁰⁵ The current king, who was born around 1920 and has been in office since 1959, does not restrict himself to religious-spiritual tasks and, as a political representative, is also politically active. In addition, he is a successful businessman. He is a qualified agricultural engineer and sees himself as a moderniser in his royal position, which links him and his people with the past. In Buganda, the largest of the revived kingdoms in the Republic of Uganda, the traditional structure of the relationships amongst king, clans and the individual is at the root of the current state organisation. This made it possible for an individual concept of democracy to emerge.¹⁰⁶

(3) *Monarchy as the Institutionalisation of Permanence in Transformation*

The institution of the monarchy promises permanence, and it is reliant on permanence in and through transformation. Disputes about succession repeatedly gave rise to wars; however, as the numerous dynastic wars of succession in the history of Europe have shown, these disputes did not necessarily undermine the monarchy.¹⁰⁷ Dynastic succession regulations provided no insurance against disputes; however, from the nineteenth century, they stemmed conflicts. Nevertheless, Spain and Portugal remained European crisis areas. In 1870, one of these crises led to the German-French war, from which the German nation state emerged. In contrast, in places where the monarch decided on his own successor (as is the case in many Asian kingdoms) or where the task was assigned to selection bodies (as is the case in the majority of African kingdoms), violence was constantly used as a means of resolving conflicts. A song praising King Mswati II of Swaziland (1840–1868) ends as follows: «No king is installed without violence.»¹⁰⁸ This was partly a result of polygamy, which heightened the competition for succession (and hence also the chances of success in the «genetic lottery»¹⁰⁹). However, in many African societies, the idea of the neces-

105 «... [T]he «skin» of the king, the palace, the city»; J.-P. Warnier, *The Pot-King. The Body and Technologies of Power*, Leiden 2007 (*Régner au Cameroun: Le roi-pot*, Paris 2009), 161–162. The name of the current king is written as King Angwafo III on the kingdom's website (<http://www.mankonkingdom.org/Dynasty.html>). Recordings of him speaking on various occasions abroad can be viewed on Youtube, for example his speech at the Watson Institute at Brown University in 2007 (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVVZerT-Jok>). In this speech, he reports on the progress made in his kingdom since he succeeded his father in 1959. He praises the kings of Cameroon as defenders of the peace both within the state and between states. In a film of the festivities marking the 50th anniversary of independence in 2009 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4BSOg_B5q4), in his address, the governor of the north-west region of Cameroon refers to the

«chief of Mankon» and the «traditional leaders». In the films of his speeches presented abroad, Angwafo III is always referred to as «King» and he also refers to himself as such. Warnier uses the terms «chief», «king» and «fo» synonymously. His assessment is based on decades of field research in Cameroon.

106 Karlström, «Imagining Democracy»; Karlström, *The Cultural Kingdom in Uganda. Popular Royalty and the Restoration of the Buganda Kingship* (PhD dissertation), Chicago, 1999.

107 V. Sellin, *Gewalt und Legitimität. Die europäische Monarchie im Zeitalter der Revolutionen*, München, 2011, ch. 3.

108 H. Kuper, *The Swazi: South African Kingdom*, New York 1986, 162.

109 This common designation was repeated innumerable times in newspaper reports on Elizabeth II's «record» 63 years on the throne, for example, by

sary violence was also due to the fact that the monarch had to be selected by a committee composed of representatives of the royal lines, which had the right to assume candidates for the office of the king. The regulations varied considerably,¹¹⁰ but they all aimed at eliminating unsuitable candidates and optimising the selection. «Blood» and «character» were the factors that dictated one's suitability for the royal office in the Kingdom of Akan (Ghana), which is a well-documented example of this process. The candidates for the office of the king and the (usually not biological) queen mother were selected from the royal clans; the non-royals were involved. Interests that opposed the election body's selection could be introduced to and negotiated during the process – including with the help of violence. The process would go on until the election body eventually found an individual, who had been scrutinised and approved of – also in relation to his physical inviolability. A complex ritual with religious and secular elements transformed the selected candidate into an elected one – a king with religious and political powers. Transcendent ideas about the position of the monarch are not unknown in modern Europe either. In surveys carried out in Great Britain in the 1950s and the 1960s, a sizeable minority of approximately 30 per cent believed that their queen was «specially chosen by God».¹¹¹ When enthronement with religious elements took place in African societies, dethronement involving ritual desecralisation was also possible in the case of serious transgressions, the criteria for which were flexible, and in the event of serious illness.¹¹² One of the common features of monarchy throughout the world is that kings can also be deposed through murder.

The rational processes that were permeated by religious elements, which are explained here based on the example of African monarchies, corresponded to the criteria ascribed by Max Weber to the parliamentary monarchy in Great Britain: «a selective admission to actual power» based on one's qualification as statesman. Weber differentiated this from «kingships on the Continent», where «mere birth-right equally endows the fool and the political genius with the pretensions of a sover-

B. Bumbacher in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 25.3.2015. See J. Steinberg, *Bismarck. A Life*, Oxford 2011 about Frederick the Great: «A genius king must be an unlikely outcome of the genetic lottery» (15).

- 110 Mair, *African Kingdoms*, ch. IX, provides a cursory overview. More detailed insight into the rules and processes of en- and de-thronement in the Kingdom of Akan (in south-east Ghana) is provided by M. Gilbert, «The Person of the King: Ritual and Power in a Ghanaian State», in: D. Cannadine / S. Power (eds.), *Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies*, Cambridge 1987, 298–330. P. C. Lloyd, «Sacred Kingship and Government among the Yoruba», in: *Africa. Journal of the International African Institute* XXX (1960) 3, 221–237, 228 demonstrates for the Yoruba kingdoms how special training

by the chiefs could form part of the enthronement process. Warnier, *The Pot-King*, adopts a strictly praxeological approach in analysing the selection and enthronement in the twentieth century in the Kingdom of Mankon (Cameroon).

- 111 A. Olechnowicz, ««A Jealous Hatred: Royal Popularity and Social Inequality», in: Olechnowicz (ed.), *Monarchy*, 291.
- 112 Gilbert, «Person of the King». On the controversy regarding the sacrality of African kings, see L. de Heusch, «Forms of Sacralized Power in Africa», in: Quigley (ed.), *The Character of Kingship*, 25–37; L. Scubla, «Sacred King, Sacrificial Victim or Frazer, Hocart, Girard», in: *ibid.*, 39–62; de Heusch, «A Reply to Lucien Scubla», in: *ibid.*, 63–66.

eign».¹¹³ The practice in pre-colonial Africa already aimed to prevent the hereditary fool from assuming the throne. In addition to the right by blood (*Geblütsrecht*), there was a regulated selection procedure, which was admittedly often pervaded by violence or the demonstration of the candidates' worth as warlords. As was the case everywhere else, success in war could make a legitimate king. European states in Africa also engaged in the religious and mystical celebration of their kings, most of all Great Britain.¹¹⁴ Throughout the entire British Empire, it adapted its monarchs «ornamentally» through their integration into the relevant culture in a way that presented them as being powerful, even if they were constitutionally tamed or already parliamentarily dethroned.¹¹⁵ This flexibility consolidated the institute of the monarchy in both worlds, at home and in the Empire. However, it never went as far as European royal families marrying into Asian or African ones. Monarchical marriage circles in the global empires also remained culturally separate.¹¹⁶ The reasons for this have not yet to be studied.

Thus, as can be established through comparison, two different paths were historically adopted in Europe, Asia and Africa to regulate succession of the monarch's office in a way that enabled the institution of the monarchy to fulfil its task of facilitating permanence in transformation. Ways of regulating succession had to be developed that could function within the relevant system of rule. In Europe, this meant that the person of the monarch gradually relinquished his or her significance in the process of constitutionalisation and, finally, parliamentarisation. However, the individual suitability to the office did not become unimportant by any means, particularly in times of war. Nevertheless, the parliamentary monarchy can live with a hereditary fool if necessary because it does not govern the country. In contrast, the kings in Africa and Asia did not relinquish their central roles in the system of rule. For this reason, the institution of the monarchy would not have been able to endure a strictly dynastic system of succession, and procedures were developed in order to enable the selection of the monarch based on competence within the framework of blood right.¹¹⁷

113 MWG I, 22–4, 562–563. Translation: From M. Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, Translated, edited, and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York 1964, 264. Weber relates the «selection» here to the parliamentary monarchy, in which the hereditary king does not select those who govern.

114 T. Ranger, «The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa», in: E. Hobsbawm/Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983, 211–262, 229–236.

115 An analysis of the «juxtaposition of British pomp and Arab picturesque» is provided by A. Clarkson, «Pomp, Circumstance, and Wild Arabs: The 1912 Royal Visit to Sudan», in: *JICH* 34 (2006), 71–85, 71.

116 D. Schönpflug, *Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern. Verwandtschaft, Politik und Ritual in Europa 1640–1918*, Göttingen 2013, offers a more detailed insight into the dynastic marriage circle in Europe (which is not

obvious from the title) and the confessional boundaries. Cf. Schönpflug, «One European Family? A Quantitative Approach to Royal Marriage Circles, 1700–1918», in: K. Urbach (ed.), *Royal Kinship. Anglo-German Family Networks 1815–1918*, München 2008, 25–34. On the Coburg Dynasty whose marriage policy was particularly successful, cf. J. Davis, «The Coburg Connection. Dynastic Relations and the House of Coburg in Britain», in: *ibid.*, 97–115. A contemporary account can be found in C. Radziwill, *The Royal Marriage Market of Europe*, New York 1915.

117 The fact that political «dynasties» are also formed in today's republics is worth a study of its own. This has mainly been examined up to now for autocracies in the form of republics. Cf. J. Brownlee, «Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies», in: *World Politics* 59 (2007), 595–628. However, it has not been

4. Monarchy – Republic: Approaches to a Performance Review

The «ornamental mask of majesty», as John Lonsdale describes it,¹¹⁸ altered the image of the imperial monarchy – in Great Britain too -, but it was limited in its effects. These were most clearly visible in Ireland. Victoria, the embodiment of Greater Britain, was also known as the «famine queen» among the Irish, albeit more among the Irish diaspora than within the country itself.¹¹⁹ The significance of the huge audiences attending royal visits and coronations is disputed;¹²⁰ it is difficult to say whether the next British king would be elected as the head of the mostly republican Commonwealth nations, and how long the citizens of Australia, New Zealand and Canada would want to see their states being represented by a distant monarch.¹²¹ It would probably depend on how long people would consider the monarchical dividend as outweighing the republican one. Many factors come into play here and the assessments are shifting. From a historical perspective, however, all of the evidence would oppose the assumption that the modernity dividend of the republican form of the state has generally exceeded that of the monarchical form in the last two centuries. A general performance review may shed some light on this.

What is involved here is an assessment that takes up the perspective of people around the turn of the twenty-first century to ask what kind of changes arose in their lifetimes and those of their parents and grandparents, and whether these changes were different in the republics and the monarchies. Did the republics stand on the side of «modernity» (however it might be defined); did they offer the individual greater possibilities of influencing state developments; were they more open to the participation of citizens; were they able to accelerate or dilute general processes; and were they more peaceful in their actions?

Up to the First World War, the political order in Europe's states developed in the direction of civil society; the possibilities for the participation of male citizens in the state, in particular, were extended considerably. The precondition for this was the increase in the significance of the parliament, and the emergence of more effective political parties and special interest organisations. The progression of these processes in the European states varied considerably, however, and the questions as to how quickly they happened, how far-reaching they were, and at which point the possibilities of civil participation were extended to women, cannot be answered on the basis of the alternative assignments of monarchy and republic. To put it more bluntly,

possible to establish enduring dynastic continuity, which is the main characteristic of monarchical legitimacy, in republics.

118 Lonsdale, «Ornamental Constitutionalism», 91.

119 Loughlin, «Royal Agency», 381.

120 E. Shils / M. Young, «The Meaning of the Coronation», in: *The Sociological Review* 1 (1953) 2, 63–81; P. Barker et al., «The Meaning of the Jubilee», *Institute of Community Studies (ICS)*, Working Paper 1,

London 2002, 1–25; J. Neuheiser, *Crown, Church and Constitution: Popular Conservatism in England, 1815–1867*, New York 2016.

121 Cf. Pimlott, «Thoughts on the Queen and Commonwealth»; on Australia, Canada and New Zealand, see Boyce, *The Queen's Other Realm*. For the perspective of a staunch Australian republican, see M. McKenna, *This Country. A Reconciled Republic?*, Sidney 2004.

while the republic could be distinguished from the monarchy as the epitome of political progressiveness in the late eighteenth century, this was no longer the case at the end of the nineteenth century and – due to the experience with the different forms of dictatorship in the form of republics – certainly not in the course of the twentieth century. This observation in relation to the twentieth century also applies to Africa and Asia.

Neither does a monarchy provide a yardstick for measuring the capacity for change in relation to societal dynamics and economic development, the establishment and further development of the education system, and the changes in the social order and emergence of the welfare state. Or a yardstick for establishing how violently or peacefully the modern state had emerged and assumed a role in the control of societal processes. The range on both sides was wide.

This also applies to the empires and their dissolutions. Anyone looking back at the end of the nineteenth century would ask how Europe's states performed in the global imperialistic power play. There were winners and losers, and again, it had nothing to do with the monarchy-republic divide. Monarchies were among the losers, but they also featured at the top of the empire league table. Republics were no more protective than monarchies in their approach to the building and defence of empires, and the same applies to decolonisation.¹²² There was no greater commitment to racial equality in republics than in monarchies either.

The alternative nation state or the state of nations (*Nationalitätenstaat*) remains one of the major unanswered questions from the nineteenth century to the present. Monarchy and republic stood and stand for both, the nation state and the state of nations, and both could be delegitimised through failure.

Despite the general and incomplete nature of this assessment, it indicates why, irrespective of the person of the monarch, the state forms of the republic and the monarchy are no longer as loaded in terms of representing a particular ideology as was still the case in Europe, North and South America around 1800, when different visions of the future were associated with them. This kind of debate appears to have only started in Asia and Africa in the processes of decolonisation, when British politics also considered whether the republic could be a more suitable state form for African states than the monarchy.¹²³ All forms of the state are ultimately judged by people on the basis of their performances. The First World War was the great lesson for the European monarchies that had failed to understand this. However, the subsequent decades held more and far bloodier lessons with the global experience of how

122 An incisive comparison can be found in J. Go, *Patterns of Empire. The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present*, Cambridge 2011; the finding is confirmed from a global perspective in W. Reinhard, *Kleine Geschichte des Kolonialismus*, Stuttgart 2008; J. Burbank / F. Cooper, *Empires in World His-*

tory. Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton 2010. A brief assessment can be found in A. Eckert, «Spätkoloniale Herrschaft, Dekolonisation und internationale Ordnung», in: A. Kruke (ed.), *Dekolonisation*, Bonn 2009, 3–20.

123 Murphy, *Monarchy and End of Empire*, 13–14.

ideological dictatorships, which were new in historical terms, arose in the form of republics. This experience completely negated the promise of progressiveness associated with the republic, and which had once been assigned to the republic as an alternative to the monarchy. This further defused the monarchy-republic opposition. Furthermore, it was not re-ignited by the post-1945 «universal civil war of ideologies and values», just as the «*translatio imperii* of our time» from the British Empire to the USA did not touch on the question of the republic or the monarchy.¹²⁴ Regional monarchies within a republic are possible in Africa today and, should the European Union develop into a state, this is also the route that could be taken in Europe.

124 D. Diner, *Cataclysms. A History of the Twentieth Century from Europe's Edge*, Wisconsin 2008, 205, 200; Diner's

translation of *Das Jahrhundert verstehen. Eine universal-historische Deutung*, Frankfurt/M. 2000, 258, 251.

Monarchy – Global.

Monarchical Self-Assertion in a Republican World

In 1793, the French republic saw the guillotining of two royal heads. In 1934, Winston Churchill spoke of the «holocaust of crowns» within his lifetime. Today, the British Queen presides over the Commonwealth, which comprises mostly republics. At the same time, there have been calls a return of the kings to republics with respect to Africa. How is this astonishing self-assertion of the institutional monarchy to be explained, and why has the antagonism between the monarchy and the republic disappeared? This will be discussed in a paper through a global perspective. Churchill was convinced: «No institution pays such dividends as the monarchy.» What dividends were earned, and for whom? What has the global presence of European states meant for the institution of the monarchy in Europe, in imperial spaces, and in decolonisation? In order to be able to analyse this issue, our study questions the legitimacy which had been both accorded to and claimed by the institution monarchy. Does monarchical legitimacy differ in Europe, Asia and Africa? Why did monarchies survived while other states and empires were created and then destroyed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? The study places three areas in the center of our consideration: the role of the monarchy as the emotional center of the nation and the empire; monarchy as a polycentric rule; and lastly, monarchy as the institutionalisation of permanence in change. Finally, the study will discuss how a comparative assessment and review of the performances by the monarchy and the republic might look.

ABSTRACT

Dieter Langewiesche

Universität Tübingen

Philosophische Fakultät

Seminar für Neuere Geschichte

Wilhelmstraße 36

D-72074 Tübingen

dieter.langewiesche@uni-tuebingen.de